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1 THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF UNIVESAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations faces an uphill battle in its bid to secure the universal realisation of 
human rights. At present, the universal pledges of the United Nations core human 
rights treaties are not, as yet, a universal reality: millions the world over suffer 
continuing, often horrific, violations of these purportedly universal entitlements on a 
daily basis. The universal ideology is challenged in turn by the competing forces of 
cultural relativism, state sovereignty, reservations and poor compliance. This thesis 
examines the United Nations universal human rights ideology and the challenges it 
faces, before ultimately concluding that the promising rhetoric of universalism remains 
far from being fulfilled: the gap between words and actions remains wide indeed. 
 
Chapter two examines the United Nations rhetoric on the universality of human rights. 
It demonstrates that international human rights law is based on the premise that 
individuals are the primary benefactors. Rights proclaimed by the United Nations in the 
Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties therefore possess a uniquely universal 
character. They are rights which, by virtue of our common humanity and dignity, must 
operate to the benefit of every individual regardless of circumstance. In theory, the 
concept of universal rights is appealing as it confers the same entitlements on all 
individuals without discrimination. Indeed, it is not only appealing but inescapable: if 
human rights are to exist, they must apply to the benefit of all individuals in furtherance 
of the realisation of their inherent dignity. The United Nations has been unrelenting in 
its insistence on the universality of rights, yet this ideology has by no means been 
unanimously accepted. On the contrary, the realisation of universal human rights, 
despite the appealing rhetoric, is fundamentally challenged by various competing forces. 
Consequently, universal human rights remain but a forlorn aspiration; a utopian ideal 
which has failed to translate to a practical reality. 
 
The impact of cultural relativism on the realisation of universal rights is discussed in 
chapter three. Cultural relativism, in contrast to the United Nations insistence on 
universality, claims that human rights are incapable of cross cultural application. This is 
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a conflict which has continued to trouble the United Nations, and which shows little 
sign of abating. However, it would appear that the traditional basis upon which the 
cultural relativist stance is premised is largely unfounded: upon closer analysis, it seems 
that the allegation of Western bias is an unfair allegation, especially when one considers 
the rights contained in the United Nations core human rights treaties. However, the 
cultural relativist argument has gained a prominent foothold in international human 
rights discourse, and is relied upon by those arguing for the rejection of the United 
Nations human rights. The danger with allowing a wholly relative approach to human 
rights is that, taken to its extreme, it rejects the possibility of any supra national values, 
and thus may be manipulated as a ruse behind which rights are violated with impunity. 
Thus, while cultural relativism does not allow the absolute abandonment of universal 
values, it nevertheless raises some valid concerns, as recognised in chapter three. 
Certainly, universal human rights must be capable of subjective interpretation, and in 
addressing this the United Nations could utilise the margin of appreciation doctrine 
developed by the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
Yet even if the United Nations is successful in demonstrating the cross cultural 
applicability of human rights, this is only the first challenge to be overcome. On a 
practical level, state sovereignty seriously impairs the likelihood of achieving truly 
universal human rights standards, as argued in chapter four of this thesis. State 
sovereignty is a fundamental principle of international law which dictates that each 
individual state possesses sole authority to determine the manner in which it treats its 
citizens. States therefore have supreme authority within their territorial borders. Thus, 
there is a dichotomy in international human rights law between the state and the 
individual. Traditional international law is concerned purely with relations between 
nations: it is inter-national. Individuals, therefore, have absolutely no role to play in 
international law traditionally. However, international human rights law does not fit this 
traditional picture as it permeates beyond the national to the individual level: it is not 
concerned solely with relations between states, but more accurately concerns itself with 
relations between state and citizen. International human rights law therefore attempts to 




Clearly, this is a fundamental conflict, and one which has seriously hampered the 
success of universal human rights. Although chapter four argues that sovereignty has 
not impeded the acceptance of universal ideals, a presumption that human rights have 
therefore irrevocably eroded the importance of sovereignty to states is misguided: in 
practice, sovereignty remains fiercely guarded and respected by states. Thus, it has 
proved prohibitive to the international protection of universal rights, demonstrated by 
tragedies such as those of Darfur and Rwanda. In the face of opposition from sovereign 
states egregaciously abusing their universal human rights pledges, the international 
community is almost fatally handicapped in the bid to protect human rights for all. 
While sovereignty reigns supreme in international relations, the likelihood of securing 
universal human rights looks bleak. 
  
Chapter five then goes on to consider the practice of states with respect to reservations. 
Often considered to be a necessary pre-requisite of any system of multilateral 
international law, reservations allow states to submit to the international human right 
regime on their own terms. They are, however, very damaging to the universality of 
rights: following the entry of reservations, a treaty can no longer be said to constitute a 
proclamation of universal rights binding in its entirety upon all state parties. Rather, it is 
reduced to a series of bilateral agreements, with different states owing different 
obligations to their citizens. International human rights treaties suffer from extensive 
reservations, and thus despite promising ratification statistics, it cannot be said with any 
degree of conviction that human rights have been universally accepted, much less 
applied.  
 
And finally, chapter six considers the most fatal of all the United Nations challenges to 
the universal human rights ideology: the chronic levels of non-compliance which 
characterise international human rights law. Implementation lies in the hands of states: 
the United Nations supervisory functions are empowered simply to monitor the 
performance of states, and they therefore rely on the goodwill of national institutions to 
ensure formal commitment to human rights treaties is realised as a practical reality for 
individuals. This, unfortunately, is not always forthcoming and consequently the level of 
compliance with international human rights standards is not reflective of the number of 
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states formally engaged in the regime. In fact, in a stinging criticism of the state of the 
world's human rights, Amnesty International's annual report concludes that “injustice, 
inequality and impunity are...the hallmarks of our world today”.1 Compliance is not an 
automatic consequence of ratification: given that ratification is capable of conferring 
significant reputational benefits upon states, human rights obligations are not simply 
assumed by those states genuinely committed to their advancement. Thus, compliance is 
not determined solely by the existence of binding obligations: it is a complex issue 
motivated by a number of factors which influence a states domestic and international 
interests.  
 
Ultimately, chapter six argues that compliance with international human rights 
obligations cannot be determined by the United Nations, and thus the realisation of 
universal human rights which are truly enjoyed by all peoples without distinction are 
ultimately outwith its grasp. While the rhetoric of universal human rights is persuasive 
and appealing, it falls short at the final, and most important, hurdle: transformation to 
practical reality. The gap between ideology and reality is wide, and while the United 
Nations has made significant inroads in the field of human rights since its inception, 
much more remains to be done if citizens of the international community are, one and 
all, to enjoy the rights and freedoms it has proclaimed.
                                                 
1 Amnesty International. Amnesty International Report 2008: State of the World's Human Rights. 
Introduction. 2008. Pg. 3. [online] URL: http://thereport.amnesty.org/document/47. Accessed 13/12/2008. 
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2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE RHETORIC 
 
Human rights are universal. Or are they? The United Nations, since its creation, has 
continually asserted that the rights set forth in international law are universal; applicable 
to all nations and all peoples. One would argue, however, that this idealist notion is far 
from a reality, despite the growth of the United Nations human rights regime since the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was first drafted in 1948. In order to fully 
appreciate why the United Nations is failing in its pledge to secure human rights for all, 
one must fully understand why the United Nations insists on the universality of rights in 
the first place. Is the notion of universal human rights defensible, or should it be 
abandoned as an unhelpful illusion in the bid to improve the lives of people the world 
over?  
 
This thesis will consider the “modern” human rights regime developed by the United 
Nations. Created in 1945, the United Nations is an organisation borne from the ruins of 
the Second World War, when the rights of man were flouted with impunity on an 
unprecedented scale. Rallying in response to the devastation of the war, World leaders 
created an international organisation determined to prevent the mistakes of the past 
from recurring again: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”2 by 
establishing “international peace and security”.3 The United Nations was born. 
 
The founding Charter of the United Nations, keen to establish the foundations for 
world peace, envisaged a key role for human rights in the new organisation. The 
preamble categorically asserts that members of the United Nations are “determined…to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”.4 This is 
reinforced in Article 1 which outlines the purposes of the United Nations, including 
achieving international cooperation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
                                                 
2 Preamble § 1. Charter of the United Nations. Signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. Entry into force 
24 October 1945, in accordance with Article 110. (hereafter Charter of the United Nations). 
3 Ibid. Preamble § 6. 
4 Ibid. Preamble § 2. 
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rights and...fundamental freedom”.5 
 
The drafters of the United Nations believed the ultimate objectives of the Organisation 
could only be successfully pursued if a broad based approach was adopted. Thus, there 
are three mutually reinforcing foundational pillars which must be addressed: the triangle 
of security, development and human rights.6 In order to secure “international peace and 
security” it is imperative that human rights are respected: “we will not enjoy 
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we 
will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all of these causes are 
advanced, none will succeed”.7 Human rights protection has always been, and will 
always be, inextricably linked to the ultimate goal of the United Nations; human rights 
“lie at the heart of everything the United Nations aspires to achieve in its global mission 
of peace and development”.8 
 
The United Nations human rights regime was not the first international recognition of 
the importance of safeguarding human rights, the issue of which was brought to the 
international plane by its discredited predecessor – the League of Nations – following 
the first world war. Thus, while the United Nations cannot take sole credit for 
pioneering the protection of human rights as an issue of international importance, the 
regime embarked upon was nonetheless revolutionary: it rejected the system of minority 
rights guarantees favoured by the League of Nations, choosing instead to advocate the 
universal applicability of rights. That is, an international rights regime which applies 
equally and without distinction to “all peoples and all nations”.9 Thus, the Charter of the 
United Nations asserted the universality of human rights by declaring that the 
Organisation must promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
                                                 
5 Ibid. Article 1(3). 
6 Slaughter, A-M. Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform. American Journal 
of International Law. 2005. Vol. 99, No. 3. Pg. 619 at 619. 
7 Report of the Secretary General. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All. 
UN Doc A/59/2005. 21 March 2005. §17.  
8 Annan, K. Foreword, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. Volume I (First Part) 
Universal Instruments. UN Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev. 6 (Vol. I/Part 1). Pg. xiii. 
9 Preamble. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. Adopted by General Assembly resolution 217 A 
(III) of 10 December 1948. (hereafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). 
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.10  
 
The United Nations promptly set about putting its utopian plan into action, and 
produced the pertinently titled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. This 
revolutionary document “profoundly changed the international landscape”,11 
encapsulating and reinforcing the belief in the future of human rights for all. The 
extension of rights to all individual members of the international community regardless 
of circumstance is purposefully cemented by the use of the term “universal” in the 
Declarations title, rather than simply “international”. This is not just semantics: the 
subtle yet significant difference between the two terms is that universal confirms its 
application to every individual without distinction, which goes beyond a simple 
international instrument which has been agreed and adopted by representatives of each 
state.12  
 
The Universal Declaration aimed to unite individuals in spite of divergent characteristics 
and ideologies,13 and furthers the universality expressed in its title by explicitly 
confirming the general and worldwide applicability of its provisions by declaring itself “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations”.14 This all 
inclusiveness is further confirmed in its first two articles which enshrine the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination; provisions which are essential in order to safeguard 
the universality of human rights.15  
 
The Universal Declaration is not, and was never intended to be, a legally binding 
international treaty, but is simply a resolution of the General Assembly.16 It does, 
                                                 
10 Article 55. Charter of the United Nations. 
11 Morsink, J. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent. University of Pennsylvania 
Press. Philadelphia. 1999. Quoted in Freeman, M. Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Polity Press. 
Cambridge. 2002. Pg. 3. 
12  Espiell, H.G. Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity. International Social Science Journal. 
1998. Vol. 50, Issue. 158. Pg. 525 at 526. 
13 Ibid. Pg. 525 at 526. 
14  Preamble. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
15  Brems, E. Human Rights: Universality and Diversity. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. The Hague. 2001. Pg. 
4/5. 
16  Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission stated “it (the Declaration) is not 
and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation” As quoted by Rehman, J. International 
Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach. Pearson Education Limited. Harlow. 2003. Pg. 57. See also, Renteln, 
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however, carry strong moral force, setting out the principles by which member states are 
to be guided. Although legally non-binding, the importance of the Universal Declaration 
should not be underestimated: it is not “the woolly, verbose and hopelessly utopian 
document it might easily have been”.17 A far greater weighting is attributed to the 
Universal Declaration than any other United Nations Declaration, being constantly 
referred to and reaffirmed by the international community. It has special prestige, and as 
such serves as a “source of inspiration”18 to which all nations can aspire.19 Indeed, it has 
even been hailed as a “magna carta for all humanity”.20 Despite the strong force of the 
Universal Declaration it was never the intention of the founders of the United Nations 
that they would stop there. The intention was to create an International Bill of Rights 
which would include the Universal Declaration and the instruments through which this 
would find legal force.  
 
Thus, the United Nations proceeded to draft two International Covenants, which 
elaborated on the rights set forth in the Declaration and afforded them legal force. The 
creators originally intended to create a single Covenant which would cover all the rights 
expressed in the Universal Declaration. The Cold War, however, saw a fundamental 
divide between the United States of America and its allies on the one hand and the 
USSR and its allies on the other. The ideological divide saw each side place different 
emphasis on the relative importance of civil and political rights compared to economic 
social and cultural rights. It was impossible to reach agreement and, for the sake of the 
progress of the international human rights regime, it was decided that the only way 
forward would be to formulate two separate covenants.  
 
Nevertheless, when taken together, the Universal Declaration and the two International 
                                                                                                                                                
A.D. International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism. Sage Publications. London. 1990. Pg. 29. 
17  Robertson, D. A Dictionary of Human Rights. Europa Publications Limited. London. 1997. 1st Edition. Pg. 
210. 
18  Preamble. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993. A/CONF.157/23. (hereafter Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action). 
19  Henkin, L. The United Nations and Human Rights. International Organization. The United Nations: 
Accomplishments and Prospects. 1965. Vol. 19, No. 3. Pg. 504 at 506. 
20  The Universal Declaration: A Magna Carta for all Humanity. Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. [online] URL: 
http://www.ohchr.orgenglish/issues/education/training/udhr.htm. Accessed 08/04/05. 
9 
 
Covenants provide a comprehensive International Bill of Rights, and the United 
Nations continued to expand its network of multilateral human rights treaties over the 
years. Today, there are a huge number of international and regional instruments dealing 
with a vast array of different human rights. This panoply of instruments, which vary in 
status from the legally binding covenants, conventions and protocols, to the morally 
guiding declarations, principles and recommendations, cover individual and collective 
rights ranging from the prohibitions on slavery and genocide to the right to self 
determination and development to the more particular rights of groups such as women 
and the disabled.21 Various complimentary regional instruments have been created in a 
bid to promote the rights elaborated by the United Nations, from the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1950 to the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights in 1981. These rights lay the foundation for a dignified life informed by free will, 
through protection from political, social and legal abuse; in essence, human rights, when 
respected and promoted, allow the human person to flourish and prosper: they “are the 
foundation of human existence and coexistence”.22 
 
Clearly, it would be impossible to consider every human rights instrument within the 
confines of the present thesis. Thus, the remainder of this study will consider only those 
rights contained in the nine core international human rights treaties (including the two 
International Covenants) which have elaborated and expanded upon the rights initially 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration, covering racial discrimination,23 civil and 
political rights,24 economic social and cultural rights,25 discrimination against women,26 
                                                 
21 A comprehensive library of human rights treaties and documents is available from the University of 
Minnesota Human Rights library. [online] URL: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ainstls1.htm. 
Accessed 28/11/2008. A non-exhaustive list of universal human rights documents is available on the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights website. [online] URL: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#instruments. Accessed 07/12/2008. 
22 Annan, K. Foreword, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. Op. Cit.  Pg. xiii. 
23 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Adopted and 
Opened for Signature and Ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965. 
Entry into Force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19. (hereafter International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination). 
24 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force 23 March 
1976, in accordance with Article 49. (hereafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
25 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into 
force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27. (hereafter International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights). 
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freedom from torture,27 children‟s rights,28 migrant workers rights,29 protection from 
enforced disappearance,30 and the rights of those with disabilities.31 This is not to 
suggest, however, that other human rights instruments are any less important.  
 
The nine core treaties built upon the proclaimed universality of human rights, with 
repeated reference to the universal promises articulated in the Charter and the 
Declaration. The two International Covenants, for example, refer in the preamble to the 
“obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms”32 while the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination reiterates that one of the 
primary purposes of the United Nations is to promote universal rights without 
distinction.33 There is therefore little doubt that the standards of the Universal 
Declaration and subsequent treaties were, and are, formulated to apply to all individuals 
regardless of circumstance.  
 
While a proclamation of universal human rights is one thing, the reality may be 
somewhat different. This thesis therefore aims to examine the relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                                
26 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Adopted and Opened 
for Signature, Ratification and Accession by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979. 
Entry into force 3 September 1981, in accordance with Article 27. (hereafter Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women).  
27 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 
December 1984. Entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27. (hereafter Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
28 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. Entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance 
with Article 49. (hereafter Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
29 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
45/158 of 18 December 1990. Entry into force 1 July 2003, in accordance with Article 87. (hereafter 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families). 
30 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (not yet in 
force). Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 61/177 of 20 
December 2006. (hereafter International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance). 
31 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Adopted and opened for signature and 
ratification by General Assembly Resolution 61/106 of 13 December 2006. Entry into force 3 May 2008 in 
accordance with Article 45. (hereafter Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities). 
32 Preamble § 4. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and Preamble § 4. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
33 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
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rhetoric of universality and the practical reality. But first, what do we mean when we 
speak of “universal rights”? And why is universality so important? 
 
2.1  Defining Universalism: The Ideology 
 
The position of the United Nations is clear: human rights are universal. But what exactly 
does this mean? According to the Oxford Dictionary, universal means “of or belonging 
to…all persons or things in the world or in the class concerned, applicable to all 
cases”.34 To speak of “universal human rights” is therefore to speak of rights of all 
persons in the world. They are the rights one has simply by being human. Human rights 
are therefore a product of our humanity, and are what make us human35: they are 
intrinsic to all persons,36 not privileges which Governments extend to their people.37 
This philosophy therefore necessarily implies that the rights tabulated in the various 
treaties must be universal: they are our birthright as they “arise from no special 
undertaking beyond membership in the human race. To have human rights, one does 
not have to do anything other than be born a human being”.38 This is referred to in 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration which states that “[A]ll human beings... are 
endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood”.39 Human rights are therefore linked to the qualities of conscience and 
reason which inform humanity: they are innate, pre-social characteristics that define 
humanity.40  
 
Advocates of universal human rights therefore essentially contend that certain rights 
inhere in all individuals regardless of particular manifestations such as culture, race or 
                                                 
34 Allen, R.E (ed). The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 8th 
Edition. 1991. Pg. 1339. 
35 Booth, K. Three Tyrannies. 1999. In O‟Byrne, D.J. Human Rights: An Introduction. Pearson Education 
Limited. Harlow. 2003. Pg. 41. 
36 Schachter, O. Human Dignity as a Normative Concept. American Journal of International Law. 1983. Vol. 
77. Pg. 848 at 853. 
37 Donnelly, J. Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of 
Human Rights. The American Political Science Review. 1982. Vol.76. Part 2. Pg. 303 at 304/5. 
38 Ibid. Pg. 303 at 305/306. 
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
40 O‟Byrne, D.J. Human Rights: An Introduction. Op. Cit.  Pg. 41 
12 
 
sex: universalism is concerned with the individual, not the context.41 According to the 
American Convention on Human Rights, one must recognise “the essential rights of 
man are not derived from one's being a national of a certain state, but are based on the 
attributes of the human person”.42 This contention is logical: if human rights were 
anything other than applicable to all, they would be merely context specific rights; rights 
which a person may achieve by virtue of residence in a particular territory, or by 
allegiance to a certain group, but not human rights. To avoid this accusation, we must 
view human rights as rights that every human being is entitled to on account of his place 
in the global community.43 The essential feature of human rights is that they are 
universal.44  
 
Clearly, the universalist assertion is that if human rights are to exist at all, then they must 
apply equally to all human beings without exceptions as to where they are or in which 
cultural tradition they have been brought up. Advocates of universalism therefore 
recognise human rights as “worldwide, overarching values to be respected in their own 
right”:45 they are not contingent upon the fulfillment of any other criteria. Universal 
human rights theorists are therefore unwilling to allow the notion of human rights to 
“compete for our allegiance on equal terms with other theories”.46 The permissibility of 
any alternative theory should be determined according to conformity with universal 
human rights: conformity indicates permissibility, while conflict indicates 
impermissibility.47 As a result state parties must promote universal respect for human 
                                                 
41 Universalism is grounded in liberal political philosophy, which favours individual liberty, and 
presupposes the individual as the basic social unit. See Pollis, A. A New Universalism. Pg. 9 at 10. In Pollis, A 
and Schwab, P (ed). Human Rights; New Perspectives, New Realities. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2000. 
42 American Convention on Human Rights. Adopted at San Jose, Costa Rica on 22 November 1969. Entry 
into force 18 July 1978 in accordance with Article 74(2). 1144 United Nations Treaty Service 123 (hereafter 
American Convention on Human Rights). 
43 An-Na‟im, Prof. A. Against Mounting Odds: Is the Universality of Human Rights Coherent or Viable 
Without International Legality? Keynote Speech at Nottingham University Human Rights Conference: Whose Culture? 
Whose Rights? Exploring the Universality of Human Rights Law. 12 March 2005. 
44 v Dijk, P. A Common Standard of Achievement. About Universal Validity and Uniform Interpretation 
of International Human Rights Norms. Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. 1995. Vol. 13, No. 2. Pg. 105 at 
108. 
45 Etzioni, A [1997(b)]. The End of Cross-Cultural Relativism. Alternatives, social Transformation and Humane 
Governance. Vol. 22, No. 2. 1997. [online] URL: http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/A253.html. Accessed 
14/12/03 
46 Jones, P. Human Rights and Diverse Cultures: Continuity of Discontinuity? Pg. 27. In Caney, S and 
Jones, P (ed). Human Rights and Global Diversity. Frank Cass Publishers. 2001.  
47 Ibid. Pg. 27. 
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rights; not selective, not relative but universal respect, observance and protection of the 
rights laid down in international law.48 Human rights are like “trump” cards which 
override any other competing considerations.49 Thus the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was the first time human rights were “recognized as belonging inherently 
to all people, rather than being gifts magnanimously bestowed upon them, or denied to 
them, by design, fate or the whims of ruling regimes”.50 
 
When one considers the United Nations human rights system it is clear that it has been 
designed as a universalist doctrine, as it ascribes a single set of core values to all of 
humanity.51 But we cannot accept the universality of human rights without further 
examination. Simple assertions of universality are insufficient without anything to 
substantiate them. Thus, it is vital to examine why the United Nations so fervently 
champions universal human rights: why is universality so important to international 
human rights? Once the justification for universality has been established, the most 
pressing issue this thesis attempts to uncover is whether human rights are, in fact, 
universal: in other words, is talk of “universal human rights” merely empty rhetoric or is 
it a true reflection of global consensus? The remainder of this chapter therefore 
examines the basis of the United Nations insistence on universal human rights, before 
we turn our attention to the problems encountered by universality in practice. 
 
2.2 Human Dignity: The Ideological Basis of Universal Human Rights 
 
As the United Nations has so unequivocally asserted the universality of human rights 
over the years, the connection between the two has become almost “self evident”52 in 
the minds of those who encounter it. However, if the United Nations believed, even 
hoped, the proclamation that rights are universal, and must be applied without 
                                                 
48 Ayton-Shenker, D. The Challenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity. United Nations Background 
Note. [online] URL: http://www.cpahq.org/uploadstore/docs/16.pdf. Accessed 23/01/2004. 
49 Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously. The Bath Press. Avon. 1991. 6th Edition. As referred to in 
Donnelly, J [1982]. Op. Cit.  Pg. 303 at 305. 
50 Pillay, N. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights turns 60. Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. December 2008. [online] URL: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/UDHRTurns60.aspx. Accessed 15/12/2008. 
51 Jones, P. Op. Cit.  Pg. 27. 
52 Brems, E. Op. Cit.  Pg. 20. 
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distinction, would be sufficient to establish the uncontested authority of the statement it 
would be a misguided and arrogant assumption. There must be some justifiable 
grounding to support it. This is provided by reference to the concept of human dignity. 
 
The founding states of the United Nations drew heavily on the notion of human dignity 
as the foundational basis for a system of all inclusive rights of worldwide applicability. 
In the post war era, members believed that a notion such as human dignity could 
provide a vision to unite nations in the search for a common goal.53 Perhaps inevitably, 
they did not go on to define what was meant by human dignity and failed to elaborate 
on its content. While the failure to determine the meaning of human dignity was 
perhaps inevitable, it does mean that we are left with little guidance when evaluating the 
merits of the universal human rights regime it preceded. Thus, “despite its prominent 
status in international law...it [human dignity] does not have a concrete meaning or a 
consistent way of being defined”.54 The United Nations appears oblivious of the need 
for any elaboration of the term: it seems that human rights should be taken as an 
automatic pre-requisite for the realisation of human dignity, and further, that human 
dignity is a universal idea which is cross culturally valid. Human dignity has been treated 
as a concept which requires no objective explanation or justification, and has come to 
be treated as a “self explanatory justification”55 for human rights protection. The 
problem is that without elaboration, “protecting human dignity” gives little guidance as 
to what is required of states in terms of human rights.  
 
So what do we mean when we speak of “human dignity”? According to the dictionary 
definition, dignity is simply “the state of being worthy of honour or respect”.56 One 
would argue that this is determined by a combination of both an individual‟s own sense 
of self worth, and the attitudes of others towards that individual.57 Immanuel Kant‟s 
ethical imperative is particularly important when attempting to define dignity. Kant 
argued that although everybody has different goals and desires, they are, one and all, 
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capable of autonomous will, and an individual should therefore be free to choose for 
himself his ends and purposes. Human beings should not be treated or manipulated as 
mere objects of the state, but should be treated as individuals.58 Thus, in line with the 
endowment of reason and the necessity of self autonomy according to Kant‟s ethical 
imperative, the ability to form ones own opinions and abide by ones own beliefs is 
central to respect for dignity.59 
 
Thus, if human dignity is taken to be the reason for human rights, it necessarily means 
that rights must be universal. Human dignity attaches to every individual by virtue of 
their membership of the human species. The Universal Declaration explicitly recognises 
this, premising the entire Declaration on the “recognition of the inherent dignity…of all 
members of the human family”.60 It is therefore a characteristic which is innate to the 
human species and is consequently a transcendent notion: it is not context specific and 
does not vary according to personal characteristics or circumstances. As Pollis argues, it 
is universal in spite of diversity throughout the world with regard to cultural forms, 
values and beliefs.61 Humanity is therefore the underlying and only requirement which 
informs dignity, and consequently necessitates the protection of universally applicable 
human rights for “all peoples”.62 Necessarily, transcendent human rights derived from 
dignity cannot be subject to arbitrary distinctions based on “race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”:63 they are universal. 
 
The reciprocal relationship between respect for human rights and fulfillment of dignity 
was painfully apparent in the aftermath of the war. Having observed the recurrent 
flouting of rights, the international community was convinced that violation of basic 
human rights severely impinged upon an individual‟s dignity.64 Protection of the 
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inherent dignity of the human person consequently offered a compelling justification 
for universality of rights. As Donnelly argues, human rights are not necessarily needed 
for life, but are certainly needed for a life of dignity: we have a human right to those 
things needed for a life worthy of an autonomous human being endowed with reason 
and conscience.65 Human rights therefore exist as a means of enabling people to live in 
dignity, and must therefore be universally protected and promoted in order to improve 
the possibility of everyone realising a dignified life. 
 
The connection between human rights and human dignity is now ubiquitous, 
demonstrated by its omnipresent recital in various international instruments.66 The 
sentiments of the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration are echoed in all of 
the nine core treaties which endorse the association between rights and dignity. Indeed, 
many go much further and categorically state that human rights “derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person”.67 Human rights are today synonymous with 
human dignity, and the United Nations clearly still holds the principle as core to its 
objectives. The “Dignity and Justice for all of Us” campaign launched by Secretary 
General Ban Ki Moon on Human Rights Day 2007, and his comments that “the 
Declaration was the first global statement of what we now take for granted – the 
inherent dignity and equality of all human beings”,68 cement the important relationship 
between rights and dignity, which is key to the United Nations.  At this juncture, the 
fundamental universality of human rights is the only sensible conclusion one can draw: 
in fact, to claim otherwise would be to deny the elementary equality of the human 
species. If one person is entitled, then surely so must be all.  
                                                                                                                                                
Working Paper No 10/2006. Pg. 4. [online] http://papers.ssrn.com/Abstract=899687. Accessed 12/10/2006. 
65 Donnelly, J. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Cornell University Press. New York. 2003. 2nd 
Edition. Pg. 14. 
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One must of course note that human dignity is often argued a Western concept rooted 
in liberalism, with limited applicability cross culturally. Yet this thesis prefers to argue 
that, far from being an incoherent abstract conception as it is oftentimes portrayed, it 
does in fact have a strong overarching element which is universally valid, which 
therefore supports the theory of universal human rights. Cultural relativists, as we shall 
see, argue that human dignity cannot serve as a sound justification for universal human 
rights, but this cannot be fully supported. Certainly, Feldman and McCrudden are 
correct when they say that there is no uniform interpretation of dignity. But this does 
not mean that the concept is not universal. Just because dignity means different things 
to different people, this does not diminish its importance as a foundation for human 
rights protection: everyone desires to achieve their particular conception of dignity and 
human rights enable individuals to achieve this. 
 
The cross cultural relevance of human dignity becomes clear when one considers that 
the Universal Declaration, with its emphasis on human dignity, has “inspired the 
constitutions of many newly independent States and many new democracies. It has 
become a yardstick by which we measure respect for what we know, or should know, as 
right and wrong”.69 Regionally, it is a prominent feature of both the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity70 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights71; the Arab Charter on Human Rights places strong emphasis on the dignity of 
its peoples72; the American Convention on Human Rights repeatedly refers to the 
dignity of man in its provisions, recognising the importance of rights to the safeguarding 
of dignity73; and while it was omitted from the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, it is repeatedly referenced in the Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which refers to the “universal value[.] of 
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human dignity”74 and devotes its first Article to the need to protect and respect the 
“inviolable”75 dignity of man. Nationally, human dignity has gained prominence as a 
feature of many recently revised or adopted constitutions, particularly for those nations 
that have suffered longstanding and widespread human rights violations in their recent 
history.76 Immediately following the Second World War, Germany's newly drafted 
Constitution earmarked human dignity as its cornerstone, requiring all state authority to 
actively “respect and protect” it.77 South Africa also relied heavily on human dignity as 
one of its founding values when drawing up its constitution following the formal 
abolition of the policy of apartheid in the earlier part of the 1990‟s.78 The system of 
apartheid was one of the most appalling continuing human rights violation of recent 
times: that human dignity features so significantly in the South African constitution is 
evidence of the fundamental link between respect for human rights and protection of 
dignity. Irrespective of geographical or political situation, human rights and human 
dignity are irrefutably connected, which is reinforced by such explicit recognition by 
diverse nations.  
 
2.3  Universal Ratification: The Practical Basis of Universal Human Rights 
 
So how, exactly, is the United Nations to ensure rights are respected, protected and 
promoted by states such that they are fully enjoyed by individuals the world over? The 
necessary first step is ensuring states embrace the rights proclaimed through ratification. 
Words alone, while they may inspire hope for the future, are nothing more than 
meaningless rhetoric if they are not supported by the participation of all members in 
legally binding treaties. This idea essentially marries the competing philosophies of 
positive and natural law by acknowledging that, while there are certain universal rights, a 
positive law system which meets these values is indispensable to its effective 
functioning: that is, universal rights will count for very little if they are not positively 
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formulated by the international community in the form of binding treaties subject to 
effective supervision and enforcement by appropriate international organs.79 
 
Moreover, mere theories alone are not enough to ensure states “promote democracy 
and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized 
human rights and fundamental freedoms…” as resolved by the General Assembly in the 
Millennium Declaration in 2000.80 For any system of international human rights 
protection to work effectively it is reliant on its members embracing their obligations 
through active participation in the relevant instruments,81 for if a state does not 
participate the international bodies are powerless to hold it to account to these 
supposedly universal norms. Universal ratification is the necessary first step on the very 
long and arduous path towards translating the normative universality of human rights 
asserted above into legal reality.82 
 
In light of the firm belief in the universality of the rights, universal ratification is a goal 
of “utmost importance”83 to the United Nations. As a result an on-going dialogue has 
emerged, with members frequently re-iterating the importance of succeeding in the goal 
of universal participation, arguing that “it is vital that the international community 
reinforces its efforts towards the ratification of international human rights 
instruments”.84 The United Nations has always believed that universal ratification would 
significantly reinforce the universality of human rights,85 and would “provide the most 
stable and effective foundation for ensuring respect for and observance of human rights 
                                                 
79 Shestack, J.J. The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. In Symonides, J (ed). Human Rights: Concepts and 
Standards. 2000. UNESCO Publishing. Aldershot. Pg. 43. 
80 General Assembly Resolution 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration. UN Doc. A/RES/55/2. 8 
September 2000. § 24. (hereafter United Nations Millennium Declaration). 
81 Smith, R.K.M [2007]. Text and Materials on International Human Rights. Routledge-Cavendish. Oxon. 2007. 
Pg. 61. 
82 Brems, E. Op. Cit.  Pg. 5. 
83 Alston, P. Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights 
Instruments. Interim Report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System. 
UN Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.11/Rev.1. 22 April 1993. § 75. 
84 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Comprehensive Implementation of and 
Follow-up to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. UN Doc. A/53/372. 11 September 1998. § 17. 
85 Alston, P. Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights 
Instruments. Interim Report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System. 
Op. Cit.  § 82. 
20 
 
in all countries”.86 In theory at least, it proves there is international acceptance of the 
norms enunciated, with consensus among vastly differing state parties that there is a 
core set of shared rights which must be respected and promoted. Ratification is essential 
as only once an instrument has been ratified will it become legally binding upon 
individual states, which should theoretically enable the United Nations organs to 
monitor state compliance in a bid to ensure states respect their human rights 
obligations. By ratifying human rights treaties, states assume legal liability for their 
provisions and the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda requires member states to observe 
the treaty and discharge their obligations in good faith.87 While this is certainly true in 
theory, in practice the mere fact that a state has assumed legally binding obligations is 
not in itself sufficient to ensure compliance. Of course it is a necessary first step, but 
compliance, as discussed in chapter six, is a far more complex issue which does not 
automatically flow directly from a states ratification of a treaty. 
 
In light of the international community‟s recognition of the universality of human 
rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action also urged the universal 
ratification of all human rights treaties.88 Member states appeared to take this on board, 
with figures demonstrating that states continued to commit themselves to the binding 
obligations of various international human rights treaties which, without exception, 
honour the influence of the Universal Declaration and repeat its assertions that human 
rights are universal and must be protected without distinction. However, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child is, to date, the only core human rights treaty to 
have secured virtual universal ratification: only two states are yet to adopt its 
provisions.89 After opening for signature in January 1990, it was accepted by states with 
unprecedented rapidity: within ten years, by the time of the Millennium Summit in 2000, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child had achieved unrivalled success. The 
Convention is one of the most extensive international instruments in terms of the rights 
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it proclaims, covering a broad spectrum of rights. These range from: civil and political 
freedoms90; to protection from economic and sexual exploitation91; to the right to health 
and education92; and the prohibition against any form of discrimination.93 The 
experience of this Convention is therefore said to serve as a “beacon of hope”94 at the 
forefront of the debate on the universality of rights and the potential for universal 
ratification; apparent evidence that there is no longer deep rooted resentment towards 
participating in the international human rights treaty regime.95  
 
The success of the Children‟s Convention is particularly interesting. After all, the rights 
proclaimed by the treaty are often a verbatim replication of those directed at adults in 
other international treaties such as the two International Covenants, for example. 
Indeed in many cases they are even more comprehensive. Why, if a state is willing to 
obligate itself to protect the rights of minors, does it refuse to accept those treaty 
provisions which seek to protect the child‟s adult counterparts: is a child entitled to 
these rights but an adult is not? Surely not: while children are a distinctly vulnerable 
group requiring extra special protection, this does not mean that adults require any less 
protection from torture, for example. Certainly, it is “odd”96 that all but two state parties 
feel comfortable obligating themselves to the extensive provisions of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, but will not accept equivalent obligations in other international 
treaties. Fiji, for example, has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but 
neither of the International Covenants, nor the Convention against Torture.97 
 
Philip Alston, the United Nations independent expert on enhancing the effectiveness of 
the human rights treaties, identified the year 2000 as the immortal date by which the 
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United Nations should seek to ensure that all member states were participating 
absolutely in the treaty system, following his comprehensive examination of the current 
treaty regime.98 However, we have sailed past that landmark by almost a decade and the 
goal of universal ratification still remains some way off, with a significant lacuna in 
participation despite an overall increase in state parties.  
 
Thus one must ask: why has the Children's Convention come so close to securing the 
elusive prize of universal membership when no other treaty has? Are there any lessons 
to be learned from the experience of this Convention which could further the 
universality of human rights norms? Primarily, in order to promote treaty provisions 
and facilitate their uptake, political will and domestic pressure must be mobilised: the 
issues must be brought to the fore of the international arena, and the importance of 
protecting these rights must be brought to bear on national governments through active 
awareness campaigns, both internationally and locally.99 When rights are brought under 
the spotlight, it becomes more difficult for Governments to blithely shrug them aside. 
The will of Governments must therefore be engaged. If human rights can be easily cast 
aside, their universality will be weakened as Governments continue to ignore their 
responsibilities to respect and protect without consequence. The fact is that the 
Children's Convention remains the only treaty to have secured universal membership. If 
the other core treaties fail to attract universal participation, can rights ever be considered 
truly universal? 
 
Optimistically, one would argue that participation by each and every state in each and 
every treaty is not necessarily prerequisite to the universality of rights. After all, as was 
mentioned above, rights are indivisible: provisions cut across multiple treaties, and 
thereby create a mesh of rights which ensnare participating states. Vietnam, for 
example, has failed to ratify the Convention against Torture but is nevertheless bound 
to prohibit all forms of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment pursuant to its 
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promises under Article 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Moreover, many rights are repeated verbatim from treaty to treaty, which helps to 
further the universality of rights. The prohibition of discrimination, for example, 
features in all but the Convention on Enforced Disappearance, and thus a member 
which is party to only one treaty would nevertheless be bound by its requirements. 
Consequently, states become entangled in a web of rights which builds up around them: 
with each ratification, the web tightens ever further.  
 
This is significant when we consider that today no member state has failed to ratify a 
single human rights treaty. Indeed, not only is every member state party to at least one 
treaty; more than eighty percent of states are party to four or more100 and six of the 
principal human rights treaties have secured the participation of three quarters of the 
world‟s states.101 Such statistics would therefore lead one to assume that all member 
states are entwined in a mesh of interrelated and interdependent human rights, 
rendering any lacuna in participation less detrimental to the overall universality of rights 
than may at first be feared. The reality, however, is that the battle to secure human 
rights protection does not end with ratification. Yes, states may find themselves 
enveloped in a web of legal obligations, but does this mean anything in practice? 
 
Unfortunately, it is evident that, as yet, human rights remain far from a universal reality. 
While the arguments presented above seem to offer a strong defence of the necessary 
universality of human rights, demonstrating the solid theoretical and practical 
justifications underlying such a principle, this is only one side of the story. In reality, 
peoples human rights continue to be abused on a daily basis and we remain some way 
short of fulfilling the pledges of the Universal Declaration, despite sixty years of trying. 
So why do human rights remain little more than a myth for so many? As will be argued 
in the coming chapters of this thesis, the gap between rhetoric and reality has been 
caused by a number of important factors which influence human rights law: namely 
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state sovereignty, cultural relativism, reservations and poor compliance.  
 
Since its very beginnings, the United Nations human rights regime has been dogged by 
the conflict between universal, overarching norms on the one hand, and both state 
sovereignty and cultural relativism on the other. These challenge the very ideology of 
universal rights, and far from abating with the passage of time, have only grown more 
vociferous. While the widespread ratification of treaties may be invoked in defence of 
the practical universality of their provisions, this is a superficial argument which fails to 
take into account some very damaging contradictory evidence. Reservations and poor 
compliance, in particular, undermine ratification and ensure that universal human rights 
remain an elusive concept rather than a practical reality. At present, as we shall see, the 
sixty year old visionary pledges of the Universal Declaration often remain little more 





3  CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE 
 
So to the first challenge facing universal human rights: cultural relativism. As we shall 
see in the examination which follows, cultural relativism questions the very essence of 
universal human rights: it is an ideology in complete opposition to transnational, 
universal norms. The ideological arguments for universality have most certainly not 
been accepted unanimously, which ultimately contributes to the gap between rhetoric 
and reality in international human rights law. One of the most persistent challenges to 
universality comes from cultural relativism, which has continued to blight the United 
Nations since the inception of its human rights regime. The relativist proposition 
attempts to undermine the theoretical justification for universal human rights, alleging 
that there can be no universal rights. Rather, according to relativists, rights are informed 
by cultural specificity. Clearly such a stance delivers a severe blow to the likelihood of 
securing universal respect for international human rights treaties: it provides states with 
a reason – or perhaps more fittingly an excuse – for rejecting or criticising the United 
Nations human rights norms. If universal human rights are to stand any chance of 
success, it is imperative that the issues raised by cultural relativists are satisfactorily 
addressed by the United Nations. 
 
So what exactly do we mean when we speak of “cultural relativism”? In essence, cultural 
relativism contrasts sharply with the universalist ideology, asserting instead that human 
rights norms actually have little cross-cultural validity and thus there can be no definitive 
list of what constitutes appropriate practice in one culture compared to another.102 
While the United Nations holds its human rights programme as “a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations”103 – that is, universal – cultural relativists 
argue that there are no absolute standards by which every nation can be bound. They 
contend that universalism implies all people and all cultures behave and think in a 
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similar fashion, but argue this is not the case in practice.104 Rather, human rights differ 
from one culture to another, and the “right and wrong” principles of human rights are 
only legitimate for the culture these values originate in.105 Thus, it must be accepted that 
“what is right or good for one individual or society is not right or good for another”106: 
rights have different implications depending on the specific orientations of each state, 
and it is therefore impossible to prescribe a definitive list of universally applicable rights 
and obligations which are transculturally binding.107  
 
The outcome of cultural relativism is that local cultural tradition properly determines the 
existence and scope of all rights and freedoms enjoyed by the individuals of that 
society.108 Jones argues that human rights as developed by the United Nations 
essentially sit in judgement over what doctrines or beliefs should be considered right or 
wrong.109 This, he argues, is unacceptable as each person should be entitled to live 
according to his or her own beliefs, rather than some extraneous proclamation of 
universal values. Thus it is quite simple: relativists vehemently deny that all rights are 
universally applicable. The implications of this stance are potentially catastrophic to the 
realisation of universal human rights: if the argument that rights are informed by culture 
is accurate and defensible, the United Nations campaign of universalism is surely 
doomed to fail. 
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3.1  The Basis of Cultural Relativism:“West Versus the Rest” 
 
It is clear that the crux of the cultural relativist challenge attempts to discredit the 
legitimacy of the United Nations universal human rights ethos. But on what basis do 
relativists so strongly resent the idea of universally applicable rights? And are their 
grievances genuinely defensible misgivings or merely a convenient ruse which is invoked 
by states in an attempt to shield some questionable human rights practices?  
 
The most widely recognised challenge to universality manifests itself in the “West versus 
the Rest” debate: relativists challenge the universality of human rights on the basis of 
the origins of the modern human rights regime. It is widely argued by relativists that 
international human rights are a product of the Western world, and as such it is their 
belief that these rights cannot apply to non-western cultures.110 Indonesian and Chinese 
representatives, for example, have both made clear comments intended to question the 
legitimacy of so called Western human rights, expressing their concern over their cross-
cultural applicability. The Indonesian Minister for foreign affairs stated that “the 
sovereign equality of states and the national identity of peoples [means that] no country 
or group of countries should arrogate unto itself the role of judge, jury and executioner 
over other countries”.111 The comments are a clear reference that the West cannot sit in 
judgement over other countries human rights standards, which are closely related to 
their national identity. Likewise, China has argued that “the concept of human rights is a 
product of historical development. It is closely associated with specific social, political 
and economic conditions and the specific history, culture and values of a particular 
country [and consequently] one should not and cannot think of the human rights 
standard and model of certain countries as the only proper ones and demand all other 
countries to comply with them”.112 This is an obvious swipe at the perceived Western 
bias of human rights, which cultural relativists argue cannot be forced upon non-
Western countries by the United Nations. These comments come despite the fact 
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Indonesia and China have respectively ratified six and five of the core human rights 
treaties, and therefore officially accept the norms they contain.113 
 
Claims of Western bias have led some international figures to assert that “the political 
predominance of one group of countries in international relations… cannot provide a 
licence for imposition of a set of guidelines and norms for the behaviour of the entire 
international community…”.114 The perceived Western origins of the international 
human rights regime therefore generates the related allegation that international human 
rights standards have been proclaimed simply in a bid to manipulate other states, 
amounting to a thinly disguised form of Western imperialism which fails to recognise or 
support any non-Western values or traditions. If universal human rights are completely 
insensitive to cultural difference, it is fair to conclude that “the complete denial of 
national and sub-national ethical autonomy and self determination is dubious at best”.115 
It was and is feared that the West adopts the pretext of human rights as a stalking horse 
in an attempt to achieve global dominance over its poorer developing neighbours.116 
China, for example, argues that the United States has used human rights “as a tool to 
pursue its power politics and hegemony in the world”.117 In fact Jones goes as far as to 
argue that universalism asserts itself as a unique doctrine in terms of status and 
applicability, but in reality represents a doctrine which is no more than a local prejudice 
of the Western world: it claims to provide a voice for all but is no more than a doctrine 
of some, “made all the more insidious as it licenses its own imposition upon the whole 
of humanity”.118 The problems of perceiving the human rights movement of the United 
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Nations as a manifestation of neo-colonialism are obvious: no country will blindly 
succumb to rule dictated by the wants and desires of another state,119 and the eminence 
of political autonomy derived from state sovereignty offers states an apparently 
legitimate excuse to retract from the international system of human rights under the 
United Nations.  
 
The problem, however, is that culture and rights do not always coincide, and if a cultural 
practice clearly violates the most fundamental of an individual‟s rights, should it be 
supported – or even tolerated – merely because it is a cultural tradition? Does culture 
override all competing considerations? Of course not. Let us consider female genital 
mutilation (FGM), for example. The term female genital mutilation encompasses a 
variety of procedures which the World Health Organisation says involves “the partial or 
total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs 
for non-medical reasons”.120 There are four commonly recognised “types” of 
circumcision: these range in severity from a slight, symbolic, incision on the genitals, to 
the most extreme excision whereby all of the external genitalia are removed and the 
vaginal opening is stitched together, leaving only a matchstick sized opening to allow the 
flow of urine and menstrual blood. These extreme and dangerous procedures are 
generally carried out without the use of anesthetic and in unsanitary conditions which, 
unsurprisingly, often results in dire and life-threatening consequences for the individual 
concerned. Recent research estimates that up to one hundred and forty million women 
and girls have undergone the procedure,121 and a further three million are at risk every 
year.122  
 
The practice of female genital mutilation is an unacceptable assault on the rights of 
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women and girls: it is a graphic embodiment of female subordination “that is deeply 
entrenched in social, economic and political structures”123 and therefore reinforces the 
inequality of women in society. It therefore violates the very object and purpose of the 
Convention Eliminating Discrimination against Women, as well as the prohibition on 
sex discrimination in the Children's Convention.124 In addition it violates a panoply of 
other basic human rights125: given that it is almost exclusively inflicted on minors,126 it 
violates many of the rights in the Children‟s Convention which aim to safeguard the 
best interests of the child127; it violates the attainment of the highest possible standard 
of physical and mental health protected by Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights128; and it violates the absolute and non-derogable 
right to freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.129 Given that the 
procedure can result in death, it may also violate the most fundamental of rights, the 
inherent right to life.130  
 
The practice of FGM is quite clearly “a critical human rights issue”131: the mutilation of 
an individual‟s genitalia in this way is an extremely harmful practice which has no 
associated health benefits but numerous, often severe, short and long term 
consequences.132 So why, then, is it so widely practiced; what perpetuates such a 
dangerous practice? Quite simply, it continues because it has become an entrenched 
cultural custom in those communities in which it is practiced, justified by the desire to 
enhance a girls marriageability by preserving her virginity and morality through the 
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suppression of her sexuality.133 More extreme beliefs also exist which are often related 
to witchcraft and lack logical validation. For example, some Malian communities believe 
that the child will die if its head comes into contact with the clitoris during birth, and a 
man who enters an unexcised woman could be killed by the secretion of a poison from 
the clitoris upon its contact with the penis.134  
 
As a result of these beliefs, over centuries FGM has become deeply engrained in the 
cultural customs and conventions of those communities which practice it, so much so 
that it has traditionally been accepted “without question”.135 A study undertaken by the 
US Department of State found that in Mali for example – where over ninety percent of 
females are subjected to circumcision – it is “so deeply rooted in tradition and culture 
that any challenge to it runs into strong social opposition and repercussions”.136 Thus, 
there are wider social implications associated with genital mutilation: often, those 
questioning its merits face ostracism from the community.137 
 
FGM persists despite the fact that twenty six138 of the twenty eight African nations in 
which it is practiced have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women; twenty seven139 have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; twenty seven140 have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; and all are party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. As stated 
above, FGM violates various provisions protected in all of these international 
instruments. Moreover, a growing number of countries have moved to enact domestic 
legislation criminalising the practice: in fact, half of the twenty eight countries where the 
practice is “endemic” have introduced legislation forbidding it and a further seven 
countries have incorporated anti-FGM legislation into their constitutions or criminal 
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laws.141 Given the barbaric nature of intrusive genital mutilation, the passing of criminal 
liability for FGM is an extremely positive and welcome progression in the search to 
protect human rights.  
 
Ensuring the law is respected and enforced, however, is another matter: a study 
published in 2000 found that prosecutions had been brought in only four of the twenty 
eight African countries in which FGM is practiced.142 A 2008 inter-agency statement on 
eliminating FGM also found that the reduction in its prevalence was not as significant as 
one would hope, despite the existence of laws prohibiting its practice.143 Clearly, given 
the fact that FGM is a firmly established custom among practicing communities, laws in 
isolation are not sufficient: criminalisation must be accompanied by a campaign of social 
change, whereby NGO's, outreach services and health programmes actively seek to 
change these entrenched beliefs by educating the community and empowering women. 
Of course this is no mean feat: it will take a sustained campaign to change social 
attitudes. If human rights are to prevail, one must not seek to influence the views of a 
few individuals: it is the attitudes of the community at large which must be modified. 
While it is cultural custom which has perpetuated the abhorrent practice, culture cannot 
be relied on as a justification for its continuation: universal human rights must prevail 
for the sake of millions of young women and girls. “Cultural relativism” must not be 
accepted as a defense to violative practices such as these. 
 
While it is evident that culture cannot stand alone as a self explanatory justification for 
human rights violation, the problem the United Nations faces in furthering the 
universality of human rights is that the perceived “Western bias” of the regime has 
nevertheless gained a firm foothold in human rights discourse. Consequently, it is 
heavily relied upon to discredit the legitimacy of international human rights as norms 
capable of influencing the practices of all nations. The rhetoric of universalism has been 
seriously compromised, and this is a prime factor in the United Nations failure to 
convert is aspirations into actions. But is the allegation of bias justified?  
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At face value, one could conclude so, which is why the clamour of cultural relativism 
has not died, despite the passing of more than half a century. The composition of the 
United Nations at the time of its founding is perhaps the most important factor behind 
claims of Western bias: in an age before mass decolonisation, the map of 1945 was 
vastly different to that of today, which seems to support the allegation that the newly 
created United Nations was a distinctly Western affair. Brems, for example, argues that 
the states which voted in favour of the Universal Declaration “can hardly be held 
representative for the contemporary world community”.144 Given the composition of 
the United Nations and the heavily colonised wider international community, it is 
almost taken as a matter of historical fact that human rights are inherently bias towards 
Western values at the expense of others. Even Donnelly seems to concede the point, 
stating that “the concept of human rights is an artifact of modern Western 
civilisation”.145 In the face of continued affirmations supporting the truth of Western 
bias, it is hardly surprising that the United Nations has so far failed to achieve its 
universal promises. Consequently, cultural relativists argue that the Western bias of 
human rights negates the universal quality championed by the United Nations: at best 
they are of limited relevance and applicability to other cultures.146 
 
However, one would beg to argue that international human rights are not the partisan 
values they are frequently portrayed as being. The fact is that early membership of the 
United Nations extended beyond the “West” alone: all regions and continents were 
represented in the United Nations, and the forty eight states that voted in favour of the 
Universal Declaration were not exclusively Western, despites Brems earlier 
accusations.147 Geographically, the United Nations was not an exclusively Western 
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organisation at the time of the Universal Declarations creation. But is it ideologically so: 
are the values it stands for distinctly Western? 
 
Claims persist that human rights treaties do not represent a true codification of 
genuinely universal, internationally accepted rights determined by the international 
community as a whole.148 Witte goes as far as to say that “it is simple ignorance to 
assume...the first international documents were truly universal statements on human 
dignity and human rights”.149 According to this view, the Universal Declaration does 
not represent rights which were recognised as universally valid at the time of its 
creation, and thus its creation alone does not self evidently prove the universality of its 
provisions.150 Rather, its drafting simply signaled the start of a movement to integrate 
the ideals it expressed into the practices of its signatories.151 When one considers the 
rights contained in the Declaration, and indeed international human rights treaties at 
large, one must question the merits of such a statement, however: it would seem to be 
an unjustified and unfair allegation. Could any nation, regardless of culture, really claim 
that the rights expressed in the Declaration do not apply to its citizens? Ask China, or 
Iran, or Zimbabwe, for example, to identify those rights which do not apply to their 
citizens and it is likely they would come up short of any defensible answer. After all, 
what rights does it contain that could be considered culturally repugnant? None, one 
would beg to argue. In a similar vein, Tharoor also questions which of the rights in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are so objectionable to states: 
“…what can one find [in the Covenant] that someone in a developing country can 
easily do without? Not the right to life, one trusts. Freedom from torture? The 
right not to be enslaved, not to be physically assaulted, not to be arbitrarily 
arrested, imprisoned, executed? No one actually advocates in so many words the 
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abridgment of any of these rights”.152 
  
Such a simple question confirms that the origins of the human rights regime, whether 
we believe them to be Western or otherwise, should bear little relevance to the universal 
applicability of its values. In fact, it should matter not: the origins of the regime does 
not mean that the rights it contains apply any less to the rest of the international 
community. The source of an ideal does not determine its legitimacy and does not 
preclude its wider applicability.153 In short, human rights “should either be considered 
valid or rejected; the source of an idea and its legitimacy should not be confused”154: 
even if the United Nations human rights movement is deemed irrefutably Western, this 
is not, in itself, sufficient to deny the applicability of its norms to non-Western 
members.155 Thus, one could reasonably assume that “the fact that the[.] [the 
International Bill of Rights was] devised by less than a third of the states now in 
existence is really irrelevant”.156 If one values the right to life, one surely values the right 
to life irrespective of which nation or region first mooted it as a right worthy of 
international protection.  
 
In addition, the process of treaty drafting surely also negates the possibility of evident 
Western bias in the norms proclaimed: all treaties are arrived at as a result of open 
negotiations representing all cultures and all backgrounds. This represents itself as a 
democratic process where small states play no less a part than their more powerful 
neighbours, and as Tharoor argues, many developing countries actually played an 
“active and highly influential” role in the drafting of the Declaration.157 When one 
considers that the seven principle drafters of the Universal Declaration hailed from 
Latin America to the Middle East and East Asia158 one would support this view. As a 
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result, it would seem that treaties are drafted and adopted by consensus, with the 
legitimate concerns of all parties given due consideration. Thus, human rights treaties 
represent a global social contract applicable to all nations.159 Indeed, it is precisely this 
method of creating human rights standards which has lead to the claim that practically 
all cultures, religions and philosophies contain principles which now appear inherent to 
human rights.160 If human rights treaties are truly developed in such a manner, there is 
no room to claim that rights are „Western‟ in origin: they have been elicited with the 
participation of all nations, regardless of culture, political affiliation or size.  
 
Perhaps the only continent which was significantly under-represented in the early stages 
of the United Nations development is Africa: heavily colonised, its nations played little 
part in the early development of human rights. Yet African nations have subsequently 
demonstrated their acceptance of many of the rights contained in the International Bill 
of Rights through the creation of their own Charter of Human Rights, which protects 
many of the same provisions. The fundamental freedom to associate161 and assemble,162 
express ones opinions,163 practice ones religion,164 and move and reside within state 
boundaries165; the inherent right to life166 and freedom from torture167; the equality of all 
persons168 and correlative duty of non-discrimination169; the right to work170 and 
education171; and pursuit of the highest attainable standard of health,172 for example, are 
common to both international and regional instruments. This is mirrored in the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights, which likewise protects a range of rights contained in the 
International Bill of Rights. Not only have non-Western nations accepted the United 
Nations treaties, they have positively embraced these very norms through their own 
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regional Charters. One must question, therefore, whether claims of “Western bias” are 
at all justified. 
 
The optimist would consequently conclude that states themselves have accepted that the 
rights proclaimed by the United Nations are universal, reasoning that states have been 
keen to demonstrate their approval of the treaties by actively participating in their 
norms through ratification. While not quite universally ratified, the United Nations 
human rights treaties have been widely adopted by the international community at large, 
which includes “non-Western” states. Moreover, the members of the United Nations 
have repeatedly reiterated the universality of rights, categorically stating at the 2005 
World Summit – by which point the Organisation had secured universal membership – 
that that “all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated”.173 The international community as a whole has continued to proclaim the 
universality of human rights, which would apparently indicate a clear acceptance by all 
its members that the rights contained in the United Nations treaties are, indeed, 
universal. Moreover, non-Western states which played no part in the creation of the 
Universal Declaration or early treaties have nevertheless been keen to endorse their 
provisions. This may therefore be taken as evidence that cultural relativism cannot 
justify the inapplicability of international human rights norms on the basis that their 
initial elucidation occurred supranationally by a particular group of states. Such 
acceptance by member states indicates that although cultural diversity is something to 
be promoted, it cannot be accepted as providing conclusive support for the rejection of 
international treaties.  
 
Yet such an idealist conclusion is, in practice, untenable. Yes, ratifications continue to 
rise across the board and there has been a steady stream of affirmations in official 
United Nations documents supporting the universality of rights. However, one would 
argue that such statements are precisely the empty universal rhetoric the United Nations 
has failed to convert into practice. Moreover, the fact that non-Western nations have 
continued to ratify the United Nations human rights treaties should not be deemed 
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irrefutable evidence of their universality: as explained in relation to state sovereignty 
below, states can ill afford to cast themselves adrift of international standards, and thus 
ratification is the natural course of action for many states regardless of cultural 
concerns, especially when one considers the lack of international enforcement following 
ratification. To simply state that all nations have participated in the drafting of a treaty is 
not sufficient to ensure the realisation of its norms. As repeatedly emphasized 
throughout this thesis, the reality underlying ratification is not necessarily a 
wholehearted commitment to human rights and thus the fact that non-Western states 
have ratified the treaties does not in itself mean that they have accepted their terms. 
 
3.2  The Implications of Cultural Relativism: Interpretation and Flexibility 
 
Let us then consider the implications of cultural relativism. It is important to note at this 
juncture that relativism does have limits, and we must draw an important distinction in 
this debate: we must not confuse “legitimate cultural specificity that is deeply embedded 
in diverse belief systems and values, and the states exploitation of this contention”.174 It 
cannot, one argues, be invoked to flatly deny the existence of universal norms; but it 
does highlight the importance of cultural sensitivity in the interpretation and application 
of said rights. While the latter is a far more subtle manifestation of relativism, its 
implications for the realisation of truly universal rights are potentially just as significant: 
if the United Nations is unwilling to demonstrate flexibility in its approach, relativism 
will continue to provide states with a get out from their assumed obligations. If, 
however, the United Nations is able to positively address the issue of cultural sensitivity, 
“cultural relativism” would no longer provide states with an excuse for evading their 
international obligations. Thus, the ability of the United Nations to overcome this long 
standing debate has a real impact on the likelihood of ever securing rights which are 
truly accepted as being cross culturally, universally valid. While we cannot accept the 
manipulation of cultural relativism for a states own ends, we must not dismiss the 
principle itself out of hand: that the issue has not been resolved before now is testament 
to the fact that the arguments of cultural relativists cannot simply be dismissed as 
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irrelevant, but instead merit serious and detailed consideration.  
 
One must therefore quash the idea that cultural relativism can provide states with a 
reasonable excuse for evading their international human rights obligations. If states were 
able to legitimately argue that the rights proclaimed by the United Nations have no 
place in their culture, the international human rights treaties would be rendered 
meaningless: in other words, if each and every right was culturally contingent, there 
should be no international human rights movement at all as nothing can be considered 
transculturally binding. Moreover, this absolutist stance would fatally compromise the 
United Nations ability to monitor the human rights practices of its members.175 If a 
state is able to argue that the norms contained in the treaties have no place in its culture, 
the United Nations will be prevented from assessing the states human rights practice by 
reference to these norms: the state will be free from international scrutiny, and abuses 
of human rights may be perpetrated unhindered and unchallenged. The worry is that 
since cultural relativism has a firm foothold in the discourse on international human 
rights, there is a risk that the genuine concerns of cultural relativists may be manipulated 
by authoritarian regimes seeking to evade their obligations, in a bid to stave off 
international interference and justify blatant human rights violations.176 In other words, 
cultural relativism may be manipulated into a shield against international scrutiny; a 
smokescreen behind which rights are violated with impunity while the offending state 
insulates itself from criticism under the banner of culture.177 Such a position is 
catastrophic to the likelihood of ever securing truly universal human rights standards. It 
is also untenable: it prevents any moral judgements being made over anyone, but “our 
moral sense strongly urges us to express our concern about genocide, torture, rape and 
other such acts, wherever they occur”.178 Thus, the “internationalisation” of human 
rights through the United Nations treaty system aims to provide a check against the 
                                                 
175 Lee, Prof Dr Z.E. Some Issues on the Universality-Cultural Relativity Debate on Human Rights. 
Challenges of Globalisation for Human Rights in Asia – Roles of Catholic Human Rights Professionals 1997. [online] URL: 
http://icmica-asia.freehosting.net/pub/bangkok/zosimo.html. accessed 06/01/2004. 
176 Patman, R.G. International Human Rights after the Cold War. Pg. 1 at 15. In Patman, R.G (ed). 
Universal Human Rights? Macmillan Press Limited. 2000.  
177 Pollis, A. Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism. Op. Cit.  Pg. 316 at 324. see also, Ghai, 
Professor Y. In Charlesworth, Prof H. Cultural Diversity in International Law. Op. Cit.  Pg. 34 at 35. 
178 Etzioni, A [1997(b)]. Op. Cit.  
40 
 
otherwise unhindered powers of the modern state.179  
 
Does this mean that cultural relativism should be condemned as a nothing more than a 
convenient clothes horse for the repression and rejection of universal rights? No, one 
would argue not. While it may be hoped that dismissing cultural relativism as a 
legitimate concern would be sufficient to banish it as a challenge to universal human 
rights, this is not so. To arrogantly reject the very possibility that another side of the 
coin exists is tantamount to universal suicide by the United Nations: it merely fans the 
flames of a more defiant and determined defence of relativity at the expense of 
universality. But this need not be the case: the possibility of universal rights need not be 
rejected entirely in order to address the concerns of cultural relativism.  
 
In fact, it is argued that the absolute rejection of the United Nations human rights 
norms is not necessarily the result desired by most proponents of culturally specific 
rights. Rather, it is submitted that the central tenet of the cultural relativist debate is not 
the total abandonment of the rights proclaimed as universal in the treaties. The issue 
seems to be more concerned with the interpretation of these rights, not necessarily their 
fundamental applicability. By questioning the universal validity of norms, cultural 
relativists are perhaps more accurately highlighting the importance of ensuring that the 
United Nations treaty rights are capable of a culturally sensitive interpretation, in spite 
of their universal character. It is argued that this is an entirely reasonable motive: there 
must be a vital distinction drawn between universality and uniformity. The idea of 
universal human rights should not be confused with rigid uniformity, which is an 
entirely different proposition. The norms tabulated by the United Nations, although 
universal, could never be applied with absolute rigidity: it is wholly unrealistic to 
presume that a single set of immutable rights could apply exactly to diverse nations. 
Thus, as cultural relativists assert, there must be a degree of latitude in the interpretation 
of treaty rights: universal human rights may be legitimately adapted according to the 
culture they are being exercised in, with different states interpreting and prioritising 
human rights in a manner consistent with their cultural obligations. 
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Even if the United Nations ultimately succeeds in its quest for universal ratification, this 
should not be taken to mean that there is no need to take into account differences 
within and between nations. Rather, it should be indicative of the fact that nations have 
signed up to a broad norm which is flexible enough to apply cross culturally. States 
agree to rights in international treaties on the basis that there is implicit understanding 
that they are able to interpret the rights according to the peculiarities of their own 
societies.180 Such subjectivity is imperative: it stems from the very nature of human 
rights founded on respect for human dignity. As was highlighted earlier, human dignity 
is presumed by the United Nations to be a self evidently universal concept. This 
assumption, however, is strongly contested by cultural relativists who instead argue that 
human dignity is a quintessentially subjective concept, incapable of abstract universal 
definition. Dignity, just as beauty, “lies in the eyes of the beholder”: how can someone 
define its essential characteristics with which all others would agree.181 If such subjective 
judgements are inherent in defining dignity, its position as a consistent informant of 
human rights practice is inevitably questioned: one must question exactly “how much 
“universality” the concept of human dignity can muster, when agnostic, theistic and 
secular view-holders all have something different to say about what human dignity 
is”.182 
 
The United Nations has, to a large extent, left itself open to this charge from relativism: 
the continued failure to elaborate on its meaning and content has merely compounded 
the belief that dignity is an abstractly subjective value. Lacking definition from the 
United Nations, there is much room to argue over the merits of human dignity as 
universalism's founding pillar. If the allegation that there is “no coherent conception of 
dignity [which] emerges transculturally”183 is correct, surely the rights required to protect 
dignity necessarily differ between nations and cultures? In fact, this thesis argues that 
while dignity is a malleable value influenced by many different factors, it can 
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nevertheless lay a defensible claim to universality. Feldman is correct when he states that 
there is little or no common understanding about what dignity requires, given that there 
is no unanimous agreement on what constitutes “the good life”.184 
 
However, one would argue that this does not impugn the validity of dignity as a 
concept: as a concept, dignity is fundamentally universal; every individual from every 
culture is entitled to their dignity. That is not to say that the realisation of dignity with 
require identical outcomes for all individuals: although universal, dignity can have 
different subjective implications for different individuals. Kant recognised that while all 
human beings must be afforded an autonomous will in order to pursue their own ends, 
those ends would not be the same for everyone. The fact that the substance and content 
of what dignity requires varies does not impugn or defeat the universality of human 
rights founded on protection of human dignity. Rather, it simply confirms and 
reinforces the worldwide general applicability of human rights by demonstrating that the 
building blocks for achieving dignity must be laid irrespective of any contingent 
conceptions of its content.185 Rather than being consigned as a concept of little 
relevance to “non-western” cultures which provides little guidance to human rights, one 
must accept that human dignity simply has different connotations for different societies 
and individuals, and no two conceptions of dignity will be exactly alike.186 Take an 
example to illustrate this point: while it may affront a Western woman to be required to 
cover her body entirely, it unquestionably protects the dignity of many millions of 
Muslim women. The dignity of each individual is equally entitled to protection, and thus 
international human rights must be sufficiently flexible to ensure this is so. What this 
means in practice for the United Nations is that human rights, while universal, must be 
capable of cultural interpretation. The ability to marry common values and diverse 
societies is regularly demonstrated by the European Court of Human Rights in its 
deliberations on the interpretation and applicability of human rights throughout Europe, 
through its use of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine. This judicial device could, it is 
argued, provide the United Nations with a much needed mediator in the battle to secure 
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universal rights in an inescapably multicultural community. 
 
Allowing a culturally sensitive interpretation of human rights does not appear to pose a 
significant threat to the realisation of universal rights. However, the fact that the United 
Nations has made little positive progress towards recognising this is the real problem. 
The Vienna Declaration appeared to confirm the importance of culture in human rights 
by stating that “…the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind…”,187 but in 
practice a hollow statement such as this does little more than paper over the ever 
growing division on the issue. It is little more than an empty gesture designed to pacify 
those countries concerned over the cross cultural applicability of human rights, but 
which has negligible practical impact. Without a concerted effort to integrate cultural 
diversity and universal human rights, the tag of “cultural relativism” has almost become 
a self explanatory shield against insensitive universalism. Cultural diversity cannot be 
cast aside lightly, and the United Nations theory of universal human rights must 
demonstrate sufficient flexibility to accommodate it. If it fails to do so, universal human 
rights will never become a practical reality. In a world where people are committed to a 
multitude of beliefs the United Nations must strive to ensure that the universal rights 
contained in the treaties may be compatible with those beliefs. Only then is there a 
chance of progressing from the realm of academia to actually achieving a practically 
effective system of universal rights throughout the entire international community.  
 
What the United Nations has failed to do is demonstrate exactly how the harmonisation 
of culture and universal rights may be achieved. In fact, it has paid little more than lip 
service to it, preferring to always reiterate the imperative universality of human rights. 
This has merely acted to exacerbate the tension between the two schools, to such an 
extent that universalists and cultural relativists view their respective adversaries with 
such contempt and skepticism that it is commonly felt that the two ideologies are 
entirely incapable of mutual co-existence. Each proposition starts from a seemingly 
defensible basis but misinterprets, exaggerates and distorts188 to such an extent that the 
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credibility of both suffers. At such an impasse, it is inevitably the advancement of 
human rights that suffers the most, and “we the people” are left to bear the brunt of the 
fallout. 
 
But why should a theory of universal rights take account of cultural diversity? The 
simple reason is this: any effective theory of international human rights is necessarily a 
practical theory. It must not be limited to the pages of textbooks and the minds of 
scholars, but is concerned with what we, as humans, should be able to do and what we 
should not have to suffer. Thus, in a world where people are committed to a multitude 
of beliefs the United Nations must strive to ensure its human rights regime is as 
compatible as possible with those beliefs, in order that it should make the transition 
from the realm of academia to achieve practical effect throughout the international 
community. If the United Nations cannot achieve this, no matter how morally 
commendable its theory may be, it will remain only a theory: diversity is an essential 
feature of human dignity189 and one which international human rights will ignore at its 
peril.190 For the sake of universal human rights, we must move beyond head shaking and 
finger pointing, and take real steps towards a sustainable theory of rights.191  
 
3.3 The Margin of Appreciation: Reconciling Universal and Relative 
 
Ultimately, if the United Nations is to protect rights and respect culture at the same 
time, there must be reconciliation: we must draw on the defensible basis of each 
doctrine in order to produce a theory of human rights which recognises the “dialectical 
interplay of universality and diversity”.192 By drawing on accumulated knowledge and 
past experience, it is possible to begin this reconciliation and reformulate human rights 
theory. By challenging traditional assumptions about rights, the international community 
stand best placed to achieve their goals. Although generally presented as two 
                                                                                                                                                
The Essentials of Human Rights. Hodder Arnold. 2005.  
189 Article 4. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
190 Jones, P. Op. Cit.  Pg. 27 at 30-31. 
191 Evans, T. Universal Human Rights: „As Much Round and Round As Ever Onward‟. The International 
Journal of Human Rights. 2003. Vol. 7, No. 4. Pg. 155 at 160-2 and 165-6 
192 Parekh, B Pluralist Universalism and Human Rights. Pp. 284-286. In Smith, R.K.M and v.d. Anker (ed). 
Op. Cit.  
45 
 
incompatible extremes, one would argue that the “inherent tension”193 between cultural 
relativism and universalism can, in fact, be mitigated.  
 
In this regard, the United Nations could follow the example of the European Court of 
Human Rights, which attempts to marry the diversity of autonomous nations with the 
commonality of universal human rights through the application of its margin of 
appreciation doctrine. The margin of appreciation is a tool of interpretation which 
permits diversity within the framework of universality: it is used to draw the line 
between what each country may decide and what is so fundamental that it entails 
absolute compliance from all countries, whatever their culture.194 The international 
human rights regime faces a tough challenge given that it aims to “ensure co-existence 
and a common aim in a fundamentally pluralistic society”.195 The margin of appreciation 
would, one argues, afford the United Nations with a possible solution to this 
conundrum. It is a doctrine which mitigates the inherent tension in international human 
rights law between universality and diversity; between international and national; 
between local and global. According to Mahoney, the margin of appreciation is the most 
effective method of addressing such tension.196  
 
So how exactly does the margin of appreciation doctrine work? And how does it 
contribute to increased human rights protection in an enormously diverse international 
community? Just as with the United Nations human rights treaties, pursuant to Article 1 
of the European Convention on Human Rights it is first and foremost the responsibility 
of member states to protect the rights and freedoms set forth.197 The margin of 
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appreciation is therefore a method of interpreting the Convention which posits the 
Court as subsidiary to national authorities: it is the line at which international 
supervision gives way to a state party‟s discretion in enacting or enforcing its laws.198 
The principle is vital as, in many situations, “state authorities are… in a better position 
than an international judge… to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing 
social need”.199 The language of the margin of appreciation was first used in the case of 
Lawless v Ireland – concerning Ireland‟s derogation under Article 15 – when it was 
explained thus: 
“The concept of the margin of appreciation is that a government‟s discharge of 
[its] responsibilities is essentially a delicate problem of appreciating complex 
factors and of balancing conflicting considerations of the public interest; and that, 
once the Commission or the Court is satisfied that the Government‟s appreciation 
is a least on the margin of [its] powers…, then the interest which the public itself 
has in effective government and in the maintenance of order justifies and requires 
a decision in favour of the legality of the Government‟s appreciation”.200 
 
As Yourow states, it is “the breadth of deference the Strasbourg organs will 
allow…before they will disallow a national derogation from the Convention, or before 
they will find a restriction of a substantive Convention right incompatible with a State 
Party‟s obligations under the Convention”.201 
 
Essentially, as the role played by the Court is intended to be primarily supervisory, there 
must be a degree of deference permitted to states when attempting to resolve conflicts 
by determining the applicability of Convention provisions.202 Although the primary 
responsibility lies with the state to ensure compliance with the Convention and to 
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resolve conflicts caused by interpretation and application of the Convention 
provisions,203 their decision remains subject to review by the Court.204 The Court must 
therefore balance the level of judicial self-restraint with the necessity of national 
regulation. The two considerations are inextricably linked: a wide margin involves 
greater judicial restraint and a narrow margin involves the court asserting itself.205 In 
Handyside, one of the most important cases in the development of the doctrine, the 
Court qualified its operation stating: 
“Article 10 paragraph 2 does not give the Contracting States an unlimited power 
of appreciation. The Court, which…is responsible for ensuring the observance of 
those States‟ engagements, is empowered to give the final ruling on whether a 
„restriction‟ or „penalty‟ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by 
Article 10. The domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a 
European supervision”.206 
 
Thus, the margin of appreciation defers to the decision making of competent national 
authorities in the interpretation and application of Convention rights: a primary concern 
of cultural relativists, who fear insensitivity towards legitimate cultural values. The 
United Nations, in search of universal values, could utilise such an approach in the bid 
to promote human rights throughout its diverse members. In fact, it is argued that the 
margin could help increase the level of rights protection throughout member states: as 
Professor Koh argues, the process of “interaction, interpretation, and internalization” of 
international legal standards is vital if states are to go beyond merely conforming their 
behaviour when convenient, to fully complying with human rights obligations.207 The 
margin of appreciation allows states to “appropriate the Convention and make it their 
own [which ultimately] brings domestic law and institutions into a deeper and more 
authentic relationship with the human rights standards in question”.208 Human rights 
                                                 
203 Hutchinson, M. R. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 1999. Vol. 48, Issue 3. Pg. 638 at 639 and 647 
204 Leyla Şahin v Turkey, Judgement of 8 June 2004. § 100. 
205 Yourow, H.C [1996]. Op. Cit.  Pg. 187. 
206 Handyside v United Kingdom. Op. Cit.  § 48/9. 
207 Koh, H.H [1996/7]. Why Do Nations Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal. 1996/7. Vol. 106. Pg. 
2599 at 2603. 
208 Carozza, P.G. Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law. The American 
Journal of International Law. 2003. Vol. 97, No.1. Pg. 38 at 75. 
48 
 
standards would therefore be absorbed by the state and become embedded into society, 
as opposed to being merely painted over the surface. The vast diversity of the United 
Nations member states is what makes the margin of appreciation so appealing: with 
such significant differences throughout member states the importance of internalising 
human rights standards is all the more pressing if the human rights treaties are to count 
universally.209 The margin of appreciation should therefore be viewed as allowing the 
contextualisation of universal standards as it maintains a common universal norm but 
allows it to be interpreted and applied in ways and means which respect the contextual 
background.210 This presumption accords with the notion of human dignity as the 
premise for human rights: dignity, as we have seen, is an inherently pliable concept, yet 
it nevertheless attaches to all individuals. Human rights may be universal, but they must 
nevertheless be capable of subjective interpretation. 
 
Of course one must note that the European Convention deals with only civil and 
political rights, yet this is not to suggest that application of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine need be limited only to such rights if utilised internationally. Rather, it is 
suggested that it could be readily transferred to the range of rights covered in the core 
international human rights treaties. Helfer and Slaughter believe that the margin of 
appreciation could be successfully transported from the regional to the international 
stage, suggesting that it “can form the basis of a potentially universalizable model”211 in 
the quest to secure an effective system of supranational adjudication. When one 
considers the rights contained in the European Convention, it is the “fundamental 
freedom” Articles which are typically subject to the margin of appreciation: rights which 
contain limitation clauses can be legitimately restricted without necessarily being 
violated.212 Articles 8 (private and family life), 9 (freedom of religion), 10 (freedom of 
expression) and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) all contain clauses to the 
effect that the right may be curtailed if the restriction is prescribed by law and 
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“necessary in a democratic society”.213 These rights may be restricted for one or other of 
a number of limited interests which include the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others, protection of morals, the interests of national security and the protection of 
public order.214 These limitation clauses feature in many of the United Nations core 
human rights treaties, not simply the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. The International Covenant on Economic social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Migrant Workers Convention, for 
example, all permit similar restrictions on rights.215 Thus it is submitted that the margin 
of appreciation is readily adaptable to cover the rights contained in these treaties: it need 
not be limited to civil and political rights alone. 
 
The operation of the margin of appreciation is regulated by two interlocking principles 
which inform its application: international consensus and the concept of living 
instrument. The level of European consensus on the protection of rights – evidenced 
through similar or harmonious national laws and practices throughout member states of 
the Council of Europe – is a decisive factor the Court will consider when calibrating the 
margin of appreciation, acting as a reference guide for the Court when determining the 
level of national discretion available.216 In effect, consensus is inversely related to the 
margin of appreciation, with the Court more likely to grant a wider margin in the 
absence of any discernible Europe wide agreement.217 However, where the domestic law 
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and practice of member states reveals a measure of common consensus, the state will be 
afforded a less discretionary power of appreciation.218 Yourow acknowledges this by 
stating that  
“just as the national margin of discretion and international supervision go „hand in 
hand‟ in the oft-repeated Strasbourg formula, so too do a lack of European 
consensus with a wider margin and state-favourable outcomes, and the existence 
of progressive European consensus with a narrower margin and applicant 
favourable outcomes”.219 Accordingly, the scope of the margin of appreciation is 
determined by reference to a perceptible presence or absence of consensus in the 
practice of the members of the Council of Europe on the substantive Convention 
issues involved.220  
 
Of course, if the United Nations organs were to adopt a margin of appreciation type 
doctrine, they must be wary of reducing the perceptible uniform standard to a 
„minimalist‟ approach, by drawing on standards which are the lowest common 
denominator throughout member states. To do this would be to sacrifice the provisions 
of the treaties for the sake of seeking a common consensus.221 If the United Nations 
cannot readily discern harmonious values which respect international standards, it must 
resist the temptation to reduce the threshold for compliance in order to elicit broad 
consensus. Where no consensus exists neither the European Court nor the United 
Nations must actively seek one at the expense of international standards: they must 
consider whether permitting a degree of national discretion or advocating absolute 
compliance with the black letter law is the most appropriate approach to take in the 
advancement of human rights protection.  
 
The role of European consensus is demonstrated with reference to particular situations. 
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In Handyside, the Court confirmed that if it is unable “to identify a Europe wide 
consensus on the treatment of a particular issue, the wider the margin[.] [it] is prepared 
to grant to the national institutions”.222 Handyside concerned the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention and the publication of obscene material: 
the applicant was the publisher of The Little Red Schoolbook and was charged under 
the Obscene Publications Act 1959223 on the basis that its contents were likely to 
“deprave and corrupt”224 those persons who read, saw or heard about the book. When 
asked to consider the matter, the Court concluded that  
“it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States a 
uniform European conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws 
of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place to place, 
especially in our era, which is characterised by a rapid and far-reaching evolution 
of opinions on the subject”.225 
 
When considering the subjectivity of human dignity, one highlighted the difficulty 
associated with the requirements of religious dress. Indeed, this is an issue considered 
by the European Court in the case of Leyla Sahin v Turkey, when it was asked to 
determine whether a ban on wearing an Islamic headscarf in a higher education 
institution was compatible with the right to manifest ones religion under Article 9(2) of 
the Convention. Having undertaken a comparative study of the place of the Islamic 
scarf in state education the Court concluded that it  
“is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the 
significance of religion in society… Rules in this sphere will consequently vary 
from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements 
imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain 
public order… Accordingly, the choice of the extent and form such regulations 
should take must inevitably be left up to a point to the State concerned, as it will 
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depend on the domestic context concerned”.226 
 
However, the restriction and ultimately denial of a margin of appreciation in areas where 
there is firm or emerging international consensus is effectively illustrated by reference to 
L. and V. v Austria, when the Court emphatically rejected the Governments arguments 
trying to justify the distinction between the ages of heterosexual and homosexual 
consent. The Court considered such a distinction to be discriminatory and in breach of 
Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, having regard to the limited margin of appreciation 
left to the Contracting State. The Court explicitly stated that the scope of the margin of 
appreciation was not unlimited, but would  
“vary according to the circumstances, the subject matter and the background; in 
this respect, one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of 
common ground between the laws of the Contracting States…In the present 
case…there is an ever growing European consensus to apply equal ages of consent 
for heterosexual, lesbian and homosexual relations”.227 
 
Similar sentiments had already been expressed by the Commission in Sutherland v 
United Kingdom when it was stated that “equality of treatment in respect of the age of 
consent is now recognised by the great majority of member States of the Council of 
Europe”.228 Thus, the available margin of appreciation was decidedly narrow. 
Internationally, the United Nations bodies would have a fine line to tread: as already 
mentioned, consensus over the application of a right may be hard to establish.  
 
The margin of appreciation therefore allows scope for different countries to adopt 
different solutions which are adapted to best suit the needs of their diverse and evolving 
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societies.229 When evaluating state practice, however, the United Nations organs must 
be constantly aware of the need to evolve and develop the meaning and understanding 
of rights: international human rights treaties must not be considered “static contract[s] 
frozen by the definitions and intentions”230 of the period in which they were framed. 
Rather, they must be flexible and adaptable to changing societal conditions, allowing a 
dynamic interpretation.231  
 
A combination of European consensus and the doctrine of living instrument will enable 
human rights bodies to determine whether a state is significantly out of step with global 
norms. When consensus shows that a state is significantly out of step with international 
opinion, the margin of appreciation will be reduced with the intention of “dragging 
along the reluctant state, where for reasons of local prejudice or inertia,… the state has 
not kept up with the understanding of the fundamental right”.232 This is clearly 
demonstrated by a ruling of the European Court which resulted in a restriction on the 
margin of appreciation deferred to the United Kingdom in respect of the legal 
recognition of the post operative sex of transsexuals. In Cossey v United Kingdom233 
the Court held that a failure to provide legal recognition of the post operative sex of a 
transsexual, with the result that Mrs Cossey was denied the right to marry,234 was within 
the permissible margin of appreciation available to the United Kingdom. There was a 
noticeable lack of consensus among the member states of the Council of Europe on the 
issue, and the Court felt bound to allow the United Kingdom a level of discretion in this 
sensitive area. However, more than a decade later the Court held that this was no longer 
an area in which the United Kingdom would be permitted latitude as there was “clear 
and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of 
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual 
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identity of post-operative transsexuals”.235 The United Kingdom was therefore ordered 
to take necessary remedial action to ensure domestic law was no longer out of sync with 
prevalent European opinion.236 
 
An evolutive approach to human rights protection overcomes the presumption of 
relativism that culture is static. Culture is rarely, if ever, static237 and even those most 
deeply ingrained and based on religious allegiance are progressive. A natural 
consequence of this dynamic and malleable character is that a culture which has 
traditionally opposed human rights may evolve or adapt in such a way as to no longer 
conflict with international standards. Shari‟a – historically based religious law – is 
undeniably part of Egyptian culture, but recent amendments to Shari‟a derived 
legislation in Egypt demonstrates the development of the culture. Shari‟a derived 
legislation did not permit Muslim Egyptian women to file for divorce in the same way as 
men: they had to go through court and provide exacting proof of abuse, while men had 
an absolute and unilateral right to divorce.238 When Egypt ratified the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a reservation was 
made that the provisions would be implemented only in as far as they did not contradict 
Shari‟a derived legislation.239 Almost 20 years later, in 2000, after 10 years of negotiation 
and fierce opposition, legislation was amended in order to permit Egyptian women to 
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initiate no fault divorce:240 something previously forbidden and probably unthinkable.241 
This effective reinterpretation of religious scripture clearly shows that even the most 
deeply entrenched values may be subject to change. Both the United Nations and the 
European Court must have the flexibility to allow the interpretation of human rights 
standards to be consistent with current societal concerns and demands.  
 
The margin of appreciation, it is argued, has the potential to harmonise universal values 
and diverse states: with flexibility, there is no reason to presume that the United Nations 
core human rights treaties cannot appy to culturally distinct nations. Indeed, given the 
fundamental applicability of these norms to all peoples, it is vital the United Nations is 
able to ensure these rights are applied by all members. Where appropriate, decisions on 
the most suitable method of interpreting and applying the provisions of international 
human rights treaties can legitimately be delegated to responsible national authorities, in 
a manner which takes into account the importance of protecting human rights while 
respecting diversity. However, that is not to say the margin of appreciation is unlimited: 
it is always subject to supervision by the Court. Thus, “while… the margin of 
appreciation is wide, it is not all-embracing”.242 There is, ultimately, an international 
minimum standard; a line below which states cannot fall. The European Convention 
and international human rights treaties were drafted to represent the lowest common 
denominator: they represent the baseline beyond which states must not fall. Thus, the 
United Nations international human rights treaties serve to “delineate thresholds for 
state compliance and not ceilings”.243 It is the role of impartial international bodies to 
determine whether state practice meets this minimum standard. If it does not, the 
margin of appreciation cannot be invoked in justification of the practice. Moreover, it is 
the case that there can be no margin of appreciation in relation to absolute, non 
derogable rights such as the prohibition on slavery or torture: these rights are non-
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negotiable. This has been dealt with by the European Court in Aksoy v Turkey,244 when 
it declared that there are no exceptional circumstances whatsoever which can justify the 
resort to torture: freedom from torture is an absolute right which cannot be derogated 
from under any circumstance. 
“Article 3...enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society. Even 
in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight against organised terrorism 
and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most substantive clauses...Article 3 
makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under 
Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation”.245 
 
How, then, does one propose to reconcile absolute rights with the desire to preserve 
cultural specificity? Quite simply, it may not always be possible to reconcile the two 
competing values. If a state practice violates the absolute prohibition on torture, it 
cannot be accepted, and states have no room to negotiate. Advocating the use of the 
margin of appreciation is not to suggest that its scope is limitless, and there are some 
cases in which culture and human rights simply cannot co-exist. If this is the case, the 
United Nations organs must strive to ensure adherence with assumed human rights 
obligations: human rights must prevail. 
 
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is argued that universal human rights can, with 
flexibility, apply to a diverse international community. Human rights must, one believes, 
protect all individuals equally and without distinction: they are and must be universal. 
The margin of appreciation may assist the United Nations in the bid to overcome this 
ideological divide. Its place is deeply rooted in the work of the European Court, which 
strives to achieve universal standards which are sensitive to cultural difference and may 
be readily adopted by the United Nations. This may assist the United Nations in the 
quest to secure universal rights by ensuring the rights proclaimed in the international 
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treaties retain credibility through the dynamic, sensitive application of their provisions. 
Yet even so, this is only one battle the United Nations must overcome if universal 
human rights are ever to match the rhetorical promises of the Universal Declaration and 
become a practical reality. State sovereignty and reservations are two further challenges 




4 THE DICHOTOMY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND UNIVERSAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
Ideologically, universal human rights assert the commonality of values in spite of 
territorial limitations. It has already been established that universal human rights are 
legitimate in spite of diversity throughout the international community: with flexibility, 
universal human rights are able to accommodate the particular requirements of different 
nations. The conflict between universality and cultural relativity is largely theoretical. 
However, the United Nations faces a correlative problem in realising the ideology of 
universal human rights which is far more practical: the omnipresence of state 
sovereignty, which continues to fundamentally inform all aspects of international law. 
State sovereignty has long challenged the United Nations human rights regime, and it 
stubbornly refuses to succumb to the demands of universal human rights. It is a concept 
of paramount importance to international relations, described by Brownlie as the “basic 
constitutional doctrine”246 of the law of nations, and by former United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan as the very “cornerstone of the international system”,247 
and has therefore come to be revered as the most sacred informant of international law 
and relations.248 Its continued existence as an immutable pillar of international law is 
therefore a primary factor in the failure to realise human rights for all. While sovereignty 
is hailed as the cornerstone of the international system, one would question whether it 
can be reconciled with the demands of the United Nations human rights ideology. In 
fact, sovereignty of states and universal human rights seem to be inherently 
contradictory: sovereignty declares that states alone are the object of international law 
and the sole arbiter of their practice, while the international human rights regime seeks 
to shift the focus to the individual by prescribing the way in which the state may treat its 
citizens. Thus, in the realm of traditional international law, which is concerned 
exclusively with relations between nations, the sovereign autonomy of states has always 
been a principle of utmost importance. The international human rights regime 
embarked upon by the United Nations in 1945 therefore signified an historic milestone 
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in international law, aiming to move beyond the boundaries of traditional international 
law by seeking to regulate the relationship between state and citizen. Obviously, such a 
fundamental shift in emphasis has occasioned fierce debate over the relative positions of 
state sovereignty and human rights: which should take precedence?  
 
While it is widely argued that sovereignty has been eroded by the existence and 
importance of universal human rights, this would seem to be part of the empty rhetoric 
of universalism emanating from the United Nations which does not actually translate 
into a reality: in practice, sovereignty remains as important to states today as it was over 
three hundred and fifty years ago when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed. Thus, the 
universality of human rights has been continually challenged by a persistent dichotomy 
with state sovereignty.249 As we will see in the examination which follows, respect for 
state sovereignty significantly challenges the United Nations insistence on universal and 
indivisible rights. This chapter will therefore explore the way in which sovereign 
autonomy challenges the ideology of universal human rights, arguing that while it does 
not seriously compromise the acceptance of universal norms, the implementation of 
these norms by sovereign states cannot be taken for granted. Thus, sovereignty seriously 
undermines the realisation of universal human rights. 
 
4.1 The Basis of International Law: Sovereignty and Non-Intervention 
 
In order to fully appreciate the challenges faced by the United Nations innovative 
human rights regime, it is essential to understand the nature of public international law 
and the correlative primacy of state sovereignty. This thesis does not purport to offer an 
all encompassing, comprehensive analysis of state sovereignty and its merits in general: 
it is more precisely an examination of its essence and relevance to the ideology of 
universal human rights. International law differs significantly from the municipal law of 
states. While municipal law applies within the state and regulates the relations of its 
citizens with each other and with the executive,250 international law has a different 
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objective. Its principal subjects are individual states, rather than individuals. A state, 
according to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, should 
possess the following qualifications: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”.251 As 
Lauterpacht explains, the orthodox positivist doctrine has been explicit in the 
affirmation that only states are the subject of international law.252 Thus, international 
law is simply that: the law of nations. It is concerned purely with the operation of 
reciprocal legal relations between sovereign states, which are the principal actors and 
objects of interest.253  
 
Traditionally, therefore, international law has been entirely state centric: the state is the 
sole subject and individuals have, at best, only a very limited role to play.254 Individuals 
lacked standing to assert any violation of international law, relying instead on protest by 
the state of nationality. This was authoritatively stated by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for the United Nations predecessor, the League of Nations, in the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case. In this case, a dispute arose between 
Mavrommatis and Great Britain: between a private individual and a state. The complaint 
was subsequently taken up on behalf of Mavrommatis by the Greek Government. Great 
Britain argued that the Permanent Court of International Justice did not have 
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, deriving as it initially had done between an 
individual and a state. According to Article 34 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice the general basis of the jurisdiction given to the Court is that “only 
States or Members of the League of Nations can be parties in cases before the 
Court”.255 Nonetheless, the Court argued that when the Greek Government took up the 
complaint  
“The dispute then entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain of 
international law, and became a dispute between two States… It is an elementary 
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principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when 
injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from 
whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. 
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action 
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its 
own rights - its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules 
of international law…Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its 
subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole 
claimant”.256 
 
Thus, any benefits of an international law system in which sovereignty and non-
intervention were respected were gauged in terms of state benefit, and while advantages 
to citizens may be derived from such a position, this would be a merely incidental, 
knock-on effect, rather than a result desired in its own right.257 The international human 
rights regime does not fit such a description, which is precisely why the realisation of 
universal norms has been impeded by the sovereign autonomy of its participants. There 
is a fundamental conflict which cannot be easily overcome. 
 
In order to operate effectively, international law is therefore premised on the sovereign 
equality of states, operating on the basis of a horizontal rather than hierarchical power 
distribution whereby all states have equal authority.258 It is of utmost importance that 
the state is independent: that is, it must have the “capacity…to provide for its own well-
being and development free from the domination of other states…”.259 Each 
independent state is therefore sovereign, having supreme jurisdiction over its territory 
and resources, including the permanent population who live there.260 State sovereignty, 
as a concept, therefore makes a broad claim about the manner in which political power 
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is exercised,261 and a state will be politically sovereign when its will is ultimately obeyed 
by its citizens, and its political power is not restrained by any higher political power.262 
Thus, as a sovereign state is not subject to any limitation of power: it is under no 
obligation to recognise any higher authority beyond its territorial borders.263 As Hinsley 
has put it, sovereignty is “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in 
the political community…and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”.264 This 
is known as external sovereignty.265  
 
4.2  Universal Human Rights: A Shift in Emphasis in International Law? 
 
So how does this fit with the ideology of universal human rights? As we have already 
seen, universal human rights aim to do the very thing sovereignty flatly rejects: bind 
states to a set of supra-national values which regulate the states treatment of its own 
citizens. This goes against all previously established rules of international law: prior to 
the advent of the human rights regime, the international community could not concern 
with the internal business of a state – particularly the states treatment of its own citizens 
– which falls within the traditionally unexaminable category of domestic jurisdiction.266 
International human rights therefore challenge this traditional limitation, interfering in 
the once sacrosanct affairs of the state and attempting to assert themselves in an area 
which has hitherto been strictly unexaminable. Indeed, it is fair to say that the concept 
of universal human rights is “a revolutionary penetration of the once impermeable 
state”.267 But do universal human rights really undermine sovereignty, or is the opposite 
true? There obviously exists an elementary ideological divide between the two premises. 
Unfortunately for individuals the world over, it seems that when it comes down to it, 
sovereignty still reigns supreme, as will be demonstrated in the coming paragraphs. 
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Universal human rights also disregard the correlative duty of non-intervention which is 
derived from sovereignty: according to established rules of international law, sovereign 
states must not interfere in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
sovereign state. All states, as sovereign equals, are entitled to freedom from external 
intervention.268  The importance of refraining from intervention in the matters of 
another state is commensurate to the importance attached to sovereignty, and is 
recognised in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 8 
of which reads that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs 
of another”.269 The twin interlocking premises of state sovereignty and non-intervention 
are purposefully secured by virtue of Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, 
which proclaims that “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state…”.270 The Charter therefore establishes the importance of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention as principles of vital importance to international 
relations: they are pre-requisites to the development and maintenance of stable and 
friendly relations as the limitation of power vis-à-vis other states results in a greater 
degree of stability between competing states in the international community.271 The fact 
that sovereignty is reaffirmed in the Charter is to be expected, given that the drafters 
were the states themselves: states, as both the drafters and the obligees of the Charter, 
would not draft a document which emphatically rejected their sovereignty. And therein 
lies the rub: the universal rights ideology instigated by the Charter of the United Nations 
cannot and does not sit in harmony with the promises of Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
Universal human rights seek to influence state practice, while the forgoing provision 
seems to guarantee a far more passive interest by the international community in a states 
internal affairs, of which human rights undoubtedly form part. Can these opposing 
principles be reconciled? And if not, what is the effect on the likelihood of achieving 
meaningful, universal human rights standards? 
 
Quite in defiance of the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, and in favour of 
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universal values, Kofi Annan utilised his term as United Nations Secretary General to 
advocate the “Responsibility to Protect”,272 seeking to engage member states as the 
guardians of universal human rights and asking them to oversee the actions of their 
peers.273 Should any state fail to protect its citizens – whether from internal or external 
persecution274 – Annan urged members to accept that it then becomes a matter for the 
international community at large to address. Thus, if it appears that one state is failing to 
adequately protect or flagrantly violating the rights of its citizens, it is the duty of the 
international community at large to act275: “each state has a responsibility to protect its 
citizens; if a state is unable or unwilling to carry out that function, the state abrogates its 
sovereignty, at which point both the right and the responsibility to remedy the situation 
falls to the international community”.276  
 
Concerning oneself with the practices of member states is of vital importance to human 
rights: if universal human rights are ever to succeed in transforming the practices of 
member states, sovereignty must not be allowed to provide states with a carte blancé 
defence against international scrutiny. Regardless of Article 2(7), the United Nations is 
an Organisation created to protect its people, not to insulate Governments from outside 
scrutiny.277 Thus, exactly as was stated by the International Criminal Court for the 
Former Yugoslavia,  
“It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, 
should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully 
against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the 
reach of the law and as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most 
elementary rights of humanity”.278  
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According to the ultimate, idealist objectives of universal human rights, state sovereignty 
simply cannot be absolute when human rights are at issue because, although it may in 
general facilitate the maintenance of peace among states, it may masquerade as a 
smokescreen behind which states can “violate human rights with impunity”.279 
Unadulterated state sovereignty would therefore delegitimise international scrutiny and 
allow ample scope for abuse by those authoritarian and repressive regimes wishing to 
deflect international attention from “cynical manipulations meant to undermine the 
effectiveness of rights”.280 However, there should be no room for states to argue their 
sovereignty in defence of questionable human rights practices: it cannot be employed as 
a means of justifying or “excusing the inexcusable”. 281 Of course our moral conscience 
tells us that sovereignty cannot trump human rights: the United Nations was created by 
the people for the people, and according to Kofi Annan, “when we read the Charter 
today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human 
beings, not to protect those who abuse them”.282 This, of course, is the only reasonable 
conclusion one can draw in the interests of universal human rights but, as we shall see, 
this is not enough to ensure its accuracy in practice.  
 
The foregoing examination of sovereignty reveals its implications for universal human 
rights. They are two diametrically opposed ideologies: while human rights are lauded as 
universal entitlements which transcend boundaries, state sovereignty rejects the very 
possibility of supra-nationally dictated norms. The international human rights 
movement instigated by the United Nations clearly sought to move beyond the shadow 
of state sovereignty, signaling a shift away from its all encompassing reach and 
questioning the continued plausibility of absolute sovereignty and the corresponding 
duty of non-intervention. There is a conflict between the previously unrivaled principle 
of state sovereignty and the innovative human rights regime initiated by the United 
Nations because they seek to protect very different interests: sovereignty guards the 
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interests of the state, while human rights aim to safeguard the best interests of its 
people. These interests do not necessarily coincide. International human rights are not, 
therefore, concerned solely with the interaction of sovereign states; on the contrary, 
they are concerned with individuals, and the relationship between a state and its citizens. 
As such, human rights are simultaneously proscriptive and prescriptive, positive and 
negative: they outline the legitimate entitlements of all individuals and by doing so seek 
to dictate the manner of the relationship between citizen and state, setting out the 
responsibilities and obligations of the state in how it acts towards its people. As 
universal entitlements, human rights are designed to act as a limitation on the legitimate 
acts of a state towards its citizens.283 While states make the decision on whether to ratify 
international human rights treaties, the norms proclaimed in the treaties are 
unquestionably for the benefit of individuals: they are the rights of citizens, not states.284  
 
Thus, despite the assurances of Article 2(7) of the Charter that heralded sovereignty and 
non-intervention as the guiding principles of international law, the regime envisaged by 
the Organisations founders was surely never designed to fit this mould. It aimed to 
move beyond a system of law which operates on the entrenched notion that states were 
the sole subjects and beneficiaries to a system which posited individuals as the primary 
subject. Undoubtedly, the universal human rights regime embarked upon by the United 
Nations in 1945 was unique in terms of its aspirations, and in an era dominated by state 
centric positivist ideas of international law, the extension of international law to include 
individuals was a novel move. By advocating a system of universally applicable rights, 
the United Nations was purporting to penetrate the previously impermeable membrane 
which protects states from outside interference and dictates that states alone are the sole 
arbiter over the treatment of their citizens. The extent to which the United Nations has 
succeeded in achieving this, however, is debatable. Despite academic clamour asserting 
the prominence of human rights over sovereignty, the reality is that sovereignty remains 
fiercely guarded by states and as such presents a significant obstacle to the realisation of 
universal human rights.  
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The obvious question arises: what does this mean for universal human rights? Can state 
sovereignty and universal rights coexist? When assessing the implications of sovereignty 
on universal human rights, one must delineate the boundaries of when sovereignty is an 
issue. It is argued that, when it comes to acceptance of universal ideals, sovereignty is 
not an insurmountable hurdle. That is, sovereignty has not precluded the formal 
acceptance of universal ideals: evidently, as demonstrated in chapter one, it has not 
hindered the widespread ratification of universal human rights treaties. This is taken by 
some as irrefutable evidence that sovereignty has been diminished by human rights. 
However, this chapter argues that sovereignty does not, in itself, affect the acceptance 
of universal ideals. Rather, the far more damaging effect of sovereignty is felt in terms 
of the implementation of those universal norms at a national level; this is the real 
challenge posed by sovereignty to the ideology of universal human rights. In theory, one 
may argue that sovereignty has been “dethroned” in light of the widespread acceptance 
of universal ideals: in practice this is most certainly not the case. 
 
4.3  State Sovereignty: The Rise or Fall? 
 
In the wake of the perpetual conflict between state sovereignty and universal rights, 
there has been a raft of academic debate over the possibility of achieving harmonious 
co-existence of the two concepts. Clearly authority regulating the relationship between 
the two is ambiguous, with the mixed messages contained in the Charter. So which is to 
come out on top? Overwhelming consensus is that, as two fundamentally opposed 
forces, they are mutually exclusive and cannot sit together without a radical 
reinterpretation or restriction of either or both concepts. As may be expected, the sword 
has fallen firmly on sovereignty: academics have become increasingly insistent that 
international human rights have gained prominence in the battle, wrestling the mantel 
from sovereignty as the prime force at the heart of international relations. So much so, 
it has even been said that to claim otherwise would be a “total nonsense”285: 
sovereignty, it seems, must yield to the demands of international human rights.  
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Given what is at stake, it is perhaps inevitable that academic theories on the interaction 
of the sovereignty and human rights would come to rest on an endorsement of 
diminished sovereignty. The pre-eminence of human rights epitomises the defining 
characteristics of an organisation created by the people for the people: although the 
Charter of the United Nations is grounded on the twin premises of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention, which operate to protect states, they do so “not because they 
[states] are intrinsically good but because they are necessary to achieve the dignity, 
justice, worth and safety of their citizens”.286 The raison d‟être of any modern peace 
loving state is therefore to protect its inhabitants from external and internal persecution 
and ensure their well being,287 which obviously encompasses respect for international 
human rights standards. In consequence, human rights can no longer be said to fall 
exclusively within the closed category of domestic jurisdiction.288 
 
But does this stack up when compared to the reality of international human rights law? 
It appears the fact that states have readily accepted the norms through treaty ratification 
has fuelled the belief that sovereignty has fallen at the hands of human rights. According 
to those who argue sovereignty has been eroded by the demands of the international 
human rights movement, the shift in emphasis in international relations has been 
voluntarily assumed by states. Sovereignty, a traditionally sacred international principle, 
is argued to represent only the starting point when considering the intricacies of 
international relations, not an immutable monolith. That is, sovereignty is the supreme 
guiding force until otherwise indicated through contrary state behaviour: according to 
those who argue that sovereignty has been eroded by human rights, ratification is 
official recognition of this fact. It seems that the primacy of universal norms at the 
expense of sovereignty has gained credence by relying on the fact that participation in 
the United Nations human rights regime is not a mandatory requirement incumbent 
upon all states on securing membership of the United Nations. Rather, it remains the 
sovereign prerogative of each state, and as such is secured only by the voluntary act of a 
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state accepting its obligations by ratifying the treaties289: the decision of whether to sign 
up to international treaties is “entirely a sovereign decision for each state to take in 
accordance with its own constitutional and other procedures”.290 The United Nations 
cannot force states to undertake treaty obligations, and therefore by ratifying 
international treaties and participating in the international human rights regime, states 
are supposedly voluntarily inviting their sovereignty to be compromised.291  
 
But formal acceptance of universal ideals through ratification does not equate to the 
uncontested abandonment of sovereignty. Certainly, ratification is a voluntary act 
undertaken by each state. But as we shall see below, it does not always initiate a positive 
change in the human rights behaviour of the ratifying state, and consequently one 
cannot conclude that universal human rights have really trumped sovereignty at all.  
 
The demise of sovereignty at the hands of universal rights may well paint a promising 
picture, but does it really stand up? One must conclude not. It is a commendable theory, 
but it is not reflective of practice. Sovereignty does not appear to have impeded the 
acceptance of universal norms, and while it is certainly positive that states have formally 
engaged these standards through ratification, this does not, in itself, signify a meaningful 
limitation of sovereignty on the part of the ratifying state. Indeed, it is entirely possible 
that states are willing to ratify treaties, and in doing so be seen to be compromising their 
ultimate sovereignty, because they are aware that this formal act will not automatically 
entail a loss of sovereignty at all.  
 
Compliance, as will be seen in the latter part of this thesis, does not necessarily succeed 
ratification: it is a far more complicated issue than may otherwise appear, and is not 
simply determined by the existence of binding standards. Ratification is vital to any state 
which aims to be taken seriously on the international stage, quite irrespective of its 
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actual or intended human rights practices: human rights have gained such a prominent 
status in international relations and diplomacy that states can ill afford to openly reject 
the universal norms protected by the various treaties. It seems most countries have now 
accepted that, regardless of their sovereignty concerns, ratification of the treaties is 
integral to their own interests. In a new world order motivated by concern for human 
rights, states need to signify their approval of human rights treaties in order to maintain 
a strong position in the international community with regard to trade and aid. Thus, 
while the international human rights regime seeks to advance beyond the traditional 
ambit of international law by attempting to regulate the relationship between citizen and 
state, it continues to play a critical role in the regulation of state to state interaction. The 
most plausible explanation for the continued widespread acceptance of treaty provisions 
is therefore the “incentive”292 to be aligned with positive human rights practices, 
combined with the comparatively low costs of ratification. And it is here, in the limited 
costs of membership, that sovereignty most fundamentally affects the prospect of 
achieving truly universal human rights standards. 
 
At face value, it is legitimate to conclude that “international supervision is valid, and 
states are accountable to international authorities for domestic acts affecting human 
rights”.293 This is what states are signing up to when they become party to and 
international human rights treaty: they promise to carry out their obligations in good 
faith, and subject themselves to external supervision from the international community 
at large. Thus, officially, international supervision is valid and states are accountable to 
international bodies for their human rights practice. The problem the international 
organs face, however, is in executing these tasks effectively: in the face of resistance 
from a member state, the United Nations is all but immobilised. This is a problem 
discussed at length in the chapter on compliance, suffice to say at this stage that the 
failings of the United Nations in ensuring the effective implementation of assumed 
obligations can be attributed largely to the entrenched and defended rules of sovereignty 
and non-intervention.  
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Thus, while sovereignty has not precluded the formal adoption of treaties and 
acceptance of their universal ideals, one would argue that this cannot be taken as reliable 
evidence of sovereignty's downfall. In fact, it is in relation to the United Nations ability 
to ensure adherence to assumed standards, or conversely the extent to which universal 
human rights can reasonably be left to state implementation, that the universal ideology 
of the United Nations faces its most pressing challenge from sovereignty: the extent to 
which sovereignty has hampered the international supervision and enforcement of 
universal human rights is what has most significantly contributed to the inability to 
transform the ideological rhetoric into tangible reality around the globe. 
  
Professor Bayefsky has concluded that today “it is undisputed that sovereignty is limited 
with regard to human rights”294 as violations of human rights are a matter of concern 
for the international community, which cannot be justified on grounds of sovereignty. 
This is of course true: the international community must not sit back and accept 
violations of human rights merely because they occur within the territorial boundaries of 
another state. When it comes to it, however, it remains a delicate and often difficult task 
for the international community to police, which inevitably compromises the 
universality of human rights: human rights can never be regarded as truly universal if 
they are persistently violated by member states. The obligation of non-intervention in a 
nations domestic affairs is still vehemently defended by states, which inevitably 
influences the course of action taken by the international community, with sometimes 
devastating consequences for the rights of individuals. Take the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, for example. One does not need reminded of the atrocities committed in this 
case, but it is the fact that the United Nations failed to act to prevent the genocide, 
despite “the gathering signs of disaster”,295 and failed to stop the killing once it had 
begun, which makes the tragedy all the more abhorrent. The devastating conflict, which 
ended up claiming the lives of more than eight hundred thousand men, women and 
children, was initially considered an internal matter; a matter which, by virtue of Article 
2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, was within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
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Rwandan authorities and precluded international intervention. While the international 
community did eventually act, the fact that the genocide was ever allowed to happen is a 
matter of “bitter regret and abiding sorrow”.296 It demonstrates, however, the deference 
afforded by member states to the sovereignty of their counterparts; deference ultimately 
at the expense of human rights. In situations such as this, the credibility of universal 
human rights takes a severe blow: the fact is, to the people of Rwanda and to many 
others the world over, so called human rights are not worth the paper they are written 
on when left in the hands of repressive regimes.  
 
The continuing crisis in Darfur is yet another example of the total disregard for the 
values of human rights, in this case by the Sudanese Government, and the 
corresponding failure of the international community to act swiftly enough or forcefully 
enough. Here, sovereignty has consistently posed a massive hurdle to human rights: it 
has prevented the international community from getting aid in to assist those affected, 
and prevented the removal indicted individuals for trial at the International Criminal 
Court for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The conflict in Darfur 
erupted in 2003 between the Government of Sudan and allied Janjawid militia on the 
one side, and opposition forces the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and 
Equality Movement on the other. Since then it has affected almost three million people: 
approximately three hundred thousand are believed to have died as a result of the 
conflict, and more than two and a half million have been internally displaced.297 The 
human rights of civilians caught up in the conflict have been violated egregiously: the 
Government and allied militia “have been responsible for killings, torture, rape, 
detentions, forced displacement, the burning of homes and villages, and the theft and 
deliberate destruction of crops and cattle”.298 Rebel forces have likewise inflicted grave 
human rights violations. Thus, the continuing crisis represents “one of the world's worst 
human rights and humanitarian catastrophes”.299  
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While the international community has tried to alleviate the crisis, efforts have been 
hampered by the sovereignty of Sudan. When the United Nations Security Council 
resolved to deploy a peacekeeping force to Sudan in 2007,300 Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon told the Security Council that “by authorizing the deployment of a hybrid 
operation for Darfur, you are sending a clear and powerful signal of your commitment 
to improve the lives of the people of the region, and close this tragic chapter in Sudan‟s 
history”.301 The Sudanese Government, however, refused to allow its implementation. 
As a result of Sudan's sovereignty, the United Nations has been rendered impotent, 
despite the perpetration of horrific human rights violations. Meanwhile, sovereignty has 
impeded the surrender of those indicted by the International Criminal Court for the 
crimes committed in Darfur. The International Court, in April 2007, acted to end 
impunity for Darfur by issuing arrest warrants for Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb and 
Government Minister Ahmad Harun. Sudan, however, has refused to surrender the 
men. Not only do they remain free despite being indicted on fifty one counts of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, Harun has been subsequently promoted to Minister 
for Humanitarian Affairs in Darfur, responsible for the welfare of those he stands 
accused of “persecuting, raping, attacking, and killing”.302 In July 2008, the Chief 
Prosecutor submitted an application for the issuance of an arrest warrant for the 
Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, whom he believes has “masterminded” the crimes 
committed in Darfur and should therefore stand trial for Genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. The international community is trying: it is the first time the 
Security Council has referred a case to the International Criminal Court, and it is the 
first time the Court has moved against an acting head of state. But the International 
Court faces problems, principally in that it relies on member states to arrest and 
surrender suspects to the Court. Despite pressure from the United Nations, Sudan 
consistently refuses to implement the Criminal Courts warrants for arrest.303 When the 
state refuses to act, the Court is powerless. The tragedy of Darfur, coming so soon after 
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the Rwandan genocide, is a graphic reminder that universal human rights are fighting a 
losing battle in the face of state practice which egregiously violates these rights with 
impunity. 
 
In consequence of the increasing prominence of human rights it has been remarked that 
“in international law, the sovereign has finally been dethroned”,304 yet it would be naïve 
to assume that a prominent human rights rhetoric has substantially eroded the 
sovereignty of states. While the ideology of universal human rights seems to leave no 
room for absolute state sovereignty, the reality is that the theory is often forced to give 
way to the reality of international relations. Certainly, it is “somewhat premature”305 to 
announce the end of state sovereignty just yet. More than sixty years after the United 
Nations was created to promote and protect human rights, state sovereignty remains a 
significant obstacle to the recognition and implementation of universal human rights, as 
demonstrated so devastatingly by crises such as Rwanda and Darfur. While the optimist 
may argue that human rights have banished state sovereignty “to the shelves of history 
as a relic from an earlier era”,306 the realist must surely conclude that state sovereignty 
still reigns supreme, hampering the chances of ever achieving truly universal rights. 
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5 RESERVATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATIES 
 
State sovereignty is also significant when one considers the reservations regime 
applicable to international human rights. As we shall see, reservations add further weight 
to the ever tightening noose around the neck of universal human rights, severely 
constricting the potential of international human rights treaties. The following 
discussion will demonstrate that reservations have the potential to significantly reduce 
the impact of human rights treaties, by enabling member states to effectively cherry pick 
the norms by which they are bound. In fact, taken to the extreme, reservations may 
allow a state to formally ratify a particular treaty or treaties without ever making a 
genuine commitment to its terms. Reservations, it would seem, are inherently 
contradictory to universal human rights. While their existence may facilitate the 
ratification of treaties by large numbers of states, their operation results in an 
insurmountable obstacle to truly universal human rights. Universal ratification through 
reservations comes at the expense of universal human rights protection and promotion. 
Thus, it is fair to say that the issue of reservations to multilateral treaties “has been [and 
continues to be] one of the most controversial subjects of contemporary international 
law”.307 
 
The previous chapters demonstrated the importance of both state sovereignty and 
cultural sensitivity to member states. It is an elementary principle of international law 
that a state cannot be held to account for anything it has not expressly accepted. State 
consent is absolute. The difficulty which must be overcome, therefore, is how to 
accommodate respect for state sovereignty and cultural difference while still ensuring 
states sign up to international human rights treaties. In bridging the gap between these 
competing premises, reservations may be seen as “a necessary evil”.308 
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In any system of international law reservations are, indeed, a necessary part of the 
landscape: they inject an element of vital flexibility into otherwise rigid international 
treaties. And while their effect may be detrimental to universal human rights, they are 
nonetheless a fact of international law; another example of why the reality does not 
match the rhetoric of universalism. The ability to enter reservations to the provisions of 
a treaty is a powerful tool in encouraging states to submit to their terms, in light of the 
importance attached to state sovereignty and cultural relativism. Goodman succinctly 
sums this up, stating that “reservations are essential to obtaining the universal 
ratification of treaties. That is, without the ability to enter a reservation, many states 
would be unwilling to assent to all terms of a particular treaty and thus would never 
submit to ratification”.309 This is certainly true: in order to secure widespread 
participation “international human rights treaties have been adopted with built-in 
flexibility to accommodate national variations in respect of those treaties”.310 Without 
this flexibility it is doubtful whether ratification statistics would look so promising. The 
correlation between ratification and reservations is supported by compelling evidence 
from the treaties themselves, and is demonstrated precisely by state practice with regard 
to two particular treaties: the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The unique position 
of the Children‟s Convention, as the most ratified treaty, has already been examined in 
chapter two. The Convention eliminating discrimination against women is not lagging 
far behind, having been ratified by over ninety percent of member states.311 In terms of 
the universality of rights such statistics are encouraging as they appear to indicate that it 
is possible to elaborate legal binding norms on which there is general consensus and 
which have been accepted by the wider international community.312 Yet isolated 
statistics such as these mask the fact that these are also the two most heavily reserved 
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treaties.313 Reservations cut across the geographical and political spectrum: they are not 
limited to a particular type of reservations entered by a particular type of member, and 
are often broadly formulated and therefore wide ranging. For example, Saudi Arabia has 
entered a reservation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child “with respect to all 
such articles as are in conflict with the provisions of Islamic law”.314 
 
But why would one claim that reservations are evil? The answer lies in the effect that is 
occasioned by allowing such flexibility. Reservations inject flexibility into the treaty 
system by effectively deferring to state sovereignty. Reservations are the ultimate refuge 
of state consent, allowing a state to stipulate its own conditions to ratification of the 
treaty. In essence, reservations allow a state to sign up to the standards dictated in an 
international treaty while simultaneously protecting its right to exclusively determine 
how it treats its own citizens, by permitting the state to formally stipulate what article or 
articles it is or is not willing to be bound by.315 A reservation is a “unilateral 
statement…made by a state…whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”,316 according 
to Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In determining 
whether a statement should be considered a reservation the European Court has 
previously stated that “one must...seek to determine [its] substantive content”.317 That 
is, the intention underlying the formulation of the statement, and the result effected by 
it, will determine whether it should rightly be considered a reservation. A reservation 
therefore effectively replaces a treaty norm dictated by the international community with 
another norm dictated by the individual state: it acts to either exclude the right entirely 
and allow the reserving state absolute freedom with regard to the reserved provision, or 
it restricts the right thereby limiting the reserving states obligations under the treaty, 
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increasing its permitted freedom of action.318 Thus, reservations allow a state to 
ingratiate itself with the international community by taking the commendable step of 
ratifying a particular human rights treaty, without actually having to relinquish any 
sovereignty it does not want to.319 A state can therefore be seen to be complying with 
international human rights law without actually accepting anything other than that with 
which it expressly agrees.320  
 
It is clear that reservations fundamentally undermine the ideology of universal human 
rights: a legally binding statement which has the effect of “exonerating a state from 
liability under a particular part of a treaty”321 poses significant implications for the 
integrity of international human rights treaty norms. The legal effect of a reservation 
therefore severely impairs the universality of international human rights norms and 
diminishes the scope of protection afforded by the treaty322: with every reservation 
entered, the United Nations moves ever further from transforming the rhetoric of 
universalism from a utopian dream to a tangible reality. With each state free to 
effectively determine its own human rights treaty through the entry of reservations, 
states will be bound by unique, rather than universal, treaty obligations. Critics of the 
traditional, liberal approach to reservations argue that the quest to secure universal 
ratification at all costs has caused the steady erosion of the integrity of international 
human rights treaties.323 One would argue that reservations, despite superficially 
appearing to take the United Nations closer to universal ratification, negate the true 
universality of treaty norms: as Cameron and Horn argue, “the rights 
guaranteed…should be seen as a unity, thus a significant reservation to one article 
weakens not simply that right but the totality of rights enjoyed by individuals in the 
reserving state”.324 Thus, universal ratification does not equate to universal acceptance 
when states are effectively allowed to pick and choose what standards they are willing to 
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adhere to.   
 
Recognising the damage reservations do to the universality of human rights, the United 
Nations has raised concerns over the number and breadth of reservations made upon 
ratification.325 However, the efforts of the United Nations to condemn reservations 
have, unsurprisingly, had little effect and few reservations made upon ratification are 
subsequently withdrawn.326 This is evidenced by Australia's reservation to Article 4(a) of 
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which the supervisory 
Committee has drawn attention to in each of its last three concluding observations. In 
1994, the Committee recommended that “the State party adopt appropriate legislation 
with a view to withdrawing its reservation to article 4(a) of the Convention”,327 
reiterated this again in 2000,328 and in 2005 noted that the reservation had still not been 
removed.329 Although disappointing, this is hardly surprising: the incentives for 
maintaining the reservation are somewhat greater than the costs of doing so. There is 
therefore little incentive to remove a reservation, particularly when one considers the 
legal effect of reservations. 
 
5.1  The Effect of Reservations 
 
When a state conditions its ratification by entering a statement which purports to limit 
its obligations under the treaty, what is its effect on treaty relations between the 
reserving state and other states? In order to fully assess the impact of reservations upon 
the United Nations goal of universal human rights, one must consider the implications 
of a reservation on not only the reserving state, but also on all other state parties. 
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Traditionally, with multilateral treaties, a reservation would only be deemed effective if it 
was unanimously accepted by all other state parties to the treaty. However, the 
requirement for unanimous acceptance becomes increasingly problematic as the number 
of states that are party to the treaty rises: with as many as 192 state parties, it is almost 
inconceivable that there would be unanimous agreement over a reservation to an 
international human rights treaty. So what is the alternative? 
 
Prior to the landmark opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Genocide 
Convention case, the unanimity rule outlined above was utilised to determine whether a 
reservation to a multilateral treaty was considered effective. Given the problematic 
nature of this rule, the question was brought before the International Court of Justice in 
relation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, when it was asked to determine whether a state that had entered a reservation 
to the treaty could still be considered party to the treaty if the reservation was objected 
to by one or more states. In delivering its advisory opinion, the majority of the Court 
declared that if universal participation was what was strived for, it would be 
inconceivable to exclude a state from treaty relations on the basis that another state had 
objected to its reservation.330 They added the proviso, however, that this should be the 
case only if the reservation was to a minor provision of the treaty. If the reservation 
impairs the object and purpose of the treaty, the outcome must be quite different, as 
explained below. Thus, the Court conclusively stated that in some cases it would be 
possible for a state to be considered a party to a multilateral treaty notwithstanding that 
certain member states objected to its reservation. In terms of universal participation, 
this is surely a positive outcome. Yet in terms of universal human rights, it is not 
necessarily such a straightforward conclusion. 
 
Following the Genocide Convention case, a state is free to either accept or object to a 
reservation entered by another member. The rules which govern this area are now laid 
down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was drafted in light of 
the Genocide Convention case and incorporates many of the opinions expressed by the 
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Court. By virtue of Article 20(4) of the Vienna Convention, acceptance of a reservation 
renders the reserving state a party to the treaty in relation to the state which has 
accepted its reservation. Acceptance of reservations, despite their detrimental effect, is 
the most common outcome. This is largely as a result of the operation of tacit consent, 
the importance of which is increased when one considers that the lack of reciprocity in 
international human rights generally results in few objections. Tacit consent, outlined in 
Article 20(5) of the Convention, means that if a state has not voiced any objection to 
the reservation within twelve months, it is deemed to have been accepted by that state. 
According to Article 21(1), a reservation which has been accepted has the legal effect of 
modifying the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relates. Thus, a reserving 
state is removed from its obligations to the extent of the reservation, and cannot, 
therefore, be held to account over the reserved provision. Moreover, although a 
reservation is a unilateral statement, this does not mean that it is the reserving state 
alone that will be removed from its obligations under the reserved treaty provision. 
While reciprocity generally plays little part in international human rights law, in that 
human rights treaties do not confer mutual benefits upon state parties, it plays an 
important role in relation to reservations. Clearly, if a state has been removed from its 
obligations under a treaty by virtue of its reservation, it can neither be held to account 
nor can it hold any other state to account in relation to those provisions. The treaty is 
accordingly modified for both the reserving state and any other member state that 
accepts the reservation, vis-a-vis each other. Such a modification of the treaty 
fundamentally negates the universality of human rights: with every reservation accepted 
– either expressly or tacitly – the treaty is fragmented and the universality of rights 
infringed. Each reservation therefore compromises the universal ideology of 
international human rights. 
 
States are, of course, always free to object to a reservation should they be so inclined, 
under Article 20(4)(b) of the Vienna Convention. If such a course is taken, it is 
potentially devastating for international human rights protection as the objecting state is 
entitled to preclude the entry into force of the particular treaty, in its entirety, between 
the two states consequent to its objection. Clearly, in a system where universal standards 
applicable to all peoples are required, preventing treaty relations between states seems 
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catastrophic. Fortunately, this is not the usual outcome of an objection. Article 20(4)(b) 
specifically indicates that unless the objecting state definitely expresses a contrary 
intention, the treaty will nonetheless enter into force between the parties, on the proviso 
that the provisions to which the reservation relates will not apply, to the extent of the 
reservation.331 Indeed, this is usually the preferred option for objecting states. For 
example, when Saudi Arabia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination a reservation was entered to the effect that “[The Government of Saudi 
Arabia declares that it will] implement the provisions [of the above Convention], 
providing these do not conflict with the precepts of the Islamic Sharia‟h”.332 Of the 
states that took the time to object to this reservation, most nevertheless expressly stated 
that their objection would not constitute an obstacle to the entry into force of the 
Convention between the parties.333 Thankfully, it seems that those states which carefully 
scrutinise the reservations entered by their counterparts are more inclined to endorse 
treaty relations than prevent them. In the interests of universal human rights, this is to 
be welcomed: better to have a state party to a somewhat diminished treaty than be cast 
aside altogether. Unfortunately, however, this is less than ideal, as while it is more 
preferable than preventing treaty relations in their entirety, irreparable damage has 
already been done to the universality of rights by the entry of the reservation.  
 
Moreover, the number of states that actually take the time to raise their disapproval of a 
fellow members reservation is disappointingly low. Reaction to reservations entered by 
both Iran and the United Arab Emirates is a clear example of the situation. The United 
Arab Emirates entered a reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women to the effect that it did not consider itself bound by 
Article 2(f) which requires states to “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, 
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to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women”.334 Only thirteen states felt compelled to raise their 
concerns over this reservation. The reaction to Iran‟s reservation to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child which, lest we forget, has achieved virtual universal participation, 
is similarly disappointing: only nine states felt compelled to object to its exceptionally 
wide reservations – made on both signature and ratification – that it would not apply 
provisions of the Convention which were incompatible with Islamic laws.335 This is less 
than five percent of state parties. Given that there is a very slim likelihood a fellow 
member will voice criticism of a reservation, it is fair to assume that a reserving state 
would find little material disadvantage to be suffered by entering a wide, general 
reservation to any of the human rights treaties. If universal human rights are indeed the 
ultimate goal of the United Nations, this is an unfortunate situation: states need to 
police the reservations of their counterparts much more tenaciously, given it is they who 
hold sole responsibility for their scrutiny. 
 
One must therefore ask: why is it that are states so remiss336 in protecting the integrity 
of human rights treaties? The answer would appear to be grounded in self-interest. 
Firstly, the lack of reciprocity international human rights plays a major part. In public 
international law, reciprocity is the guiding force which motivates a state to react to the 
reservations of another state. However, as already highlighted, the general rules of 
reciprocity do not apply to international human rights treaties, which do not purport to 
confer mutual benefits and obligations upon state parties. The International Court of 
Justice confirmed that reciprocity does not apply to human rights treaties, stating that 
“the contracting parties do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one 
and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which 
are the raison d‟être of the Convention”.337 This sentiment was reiterated by the Human 
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Rights Committee in General Comment 24 which categorically stated that “inter-state 
reciprocity has no place [in relation to human rights treaties as these treaties do not 
represent] a web of inter-state exchanges of mutual obligations [but rather they] concern 
the endowment of individuals with rights”.338 Thus, a state will not be released from its 
own human rights obligations simply by virtue of its objection to a reservation.339 The 
lack of reciprocity therefore means that states often see little legal interest or benefit in 
objecting to reservations. Secondly, states are also wary of openly criticising one of their 
own. Good relations are not to be jeopardised lightly, and states are therefore reticent 
about proclaiming judgement on the stance of other members for fear that it may 
adversely affect a delicate political balance. Thus, “in the interests of mutual 
solidarity”340 states are generally disinclined to criticise others. 
 
The upshot of either accepting or objecting to a reservation is, in effect, the same: a 
move away from securing universal human rights as a practical reality. Reservations 
essentially break down a supposedly universal multilateral treaty into a series of bilateral 
agreements between states. The net result is that the treaty itself often turns out to be 
little more than a “moth-eaten guarantee”,341 rather than a proclamation of universal, 
indivisible and interrelated rights,342 with states owing different obligations to different 
states.343 Reservations therefore seriously undermine the United Nations claims about 
the universality, interdependence and interrelatedness of human rights as they allow 
states to opt out of particular obligations and effectively pick and choose what 
obligations they are willing to assume.344 If states are essentially free to cherry pick the 
treaty norms they are willing to accept, human rights are, in effect, reduced to privileges 
which the state affords to its citizens rather than the inherent rights of all peoples. 
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5.2 Determining Admissibility: The Object and Purpose Test 
 
In light of the potentially damaging nature of reservations, it is imperative the United 
Nations have some mechanism of limiting their scope, thereby curtailing – or at least 
stemming – the damage done to universality. This is where the object and purpose test 
comes into play. The object and purpose test seeks to regulate the reservations regime 
by prohibiting the entry and operation of impermissible reservations. This rule was first 
identified in the aforementioned Genocide Convention case, when it was declared that 
while states should be permitted to enter a minor reservation without foregoing their 
membership of the treaty, they should not be permitted to enter reservations which 
fundamentally impair the raison d'etre of the treaty.345 There are therefore limits as to 
how far states can go in entering reservations to international treaty provisions: they 
should not be permitted to enter reservations which seriously compromise the integrity 
of the treaty. 
 
While those who strive for truly universal human rights should welcome any measure 
which attempts to curtail the reach of reservations, the object and purpose test is 
perhaps not the most effective tool to ensure this. Rather, it is fraught with difficulty. 
While the International Court may have envisioned the object and purpose test as a 
sensible and straightforward safeguard designed to protect treaty integrity, when applied 
to multi-faceted human rights treaties it is more likely to be prohibitively complex. 
Difficulties arise almost immediately one tries to determine the object and purpose of 
lengthy, multi-faceted human rights treaties which have provisions of equal, as opposed 
to hierarchical, status.346 The dissenting opinion in the Genocide Convvention case 
contemplated as much, when it was insightfully argued that a decision on the object and 
purpose of a treaty would inevitably involve detailed scrutiny of its actual provisions.347 
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According to the United States of America, “an „object and purpose‟ analysis by its 
nature requires consideration of the particular treaty, right, and reservation in 
question”348 as it is not possible to make any absolute statements as to the type of 
reservation which would always be regarded as contrary to the object and purpose of 
the treaty. In short, there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the object and 
purpose test: there is no simple formula which can be relied upon to determine whether 
a reservation conforms with or contravenes the rule, as was argued by the Human 
Rights Committee in its General Comment 24. 
 
Such uncertainty therefore begs the question: who is responsible for determining 
impermissibility? Given what is at stake, it is hardly surprising that the Human Rights 
Committee has laid its claim as the appropriate body for the job.349 Bearing in mind the 
very nature of the international supervisory organs and the task with which they are 
entrusted, such a solution would indeed be a positive one. The supervisory organs, 
composed of independent experts, are entrusted with ensuring the effective 
implementation of their respective treaties.350 Surely, if any body could be trusted to 
reach a reasoned, impartial decision on the permissibility of a reservation it would be 
these treaty monitoring bodies. Moreover, this is precisely the type of consideration the 
committees must engage in to perform their role as monitoring body effectively.351 In 
terms of furthering the universality of human rights, allowing the treaty monitoring 
bodies to preside over the compatibility of reservations with the object and purpose of 
the treaty should be endorsed as a welcome one.  
 
Unsurprisingly, this assertion has been strongly contested by states themselves. The 
United Kingdom argues that, while the Committees may necessarily hold a view as to 
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the status of a reservation, that view cannot be deemed “determinative”.352 While the 
Committees view may assist other member states in their consideration of a reservation, 
it is the member state alone who must have the final word its legitimacy. The United 
States flatly rejected the possibility of transferring power to the treaty monitoring bodies 
in this regard, simply noting that “the Committee‟s position, while interesting, runs 
contrary to the Covenant scheme and international law”.353 Clearly, there is no intention 
of handing over any power to the supra national treaty bodies. Ultimately, as with so 
much in international human rights, there is little chance of overcoming the will of 
member states. Thus, as demanded, it is member states themselves that are responsible 
for monitoring reservations, drawing attention to those which impair the object and 
purpose of a treaty as and when required. This, of course, does not always happen; it 
has already been established that a lack of reciprocity results in a lax attitude towards the 
reservations of counterparts, which extends to those which are flatly contradictory of 
the treaties fundamental objectives. By letting impermissible reservations go unnoticed, 
it is the realisation and advancement of universal human rights that suffers. 
 
5.3 The Problem of Impermissible Reservations 
 
The object and purpose test, in spite of its shortcomings, clearly attempts to prevent 
states from jeopardising the raison d'etre of treaties. Unfortunately, the mere existence 
of the rule does little to ensure it is respected by states: many reservations that appear to 
contradict a treaty's object and purpose are nevertheless entered. The question thus 
arises: what happens if a state does enter an impermissible reservation? What is its legal 
effect? This is an ambiguous and contentious area, and the Vienna Convention is silent 
on the matter. Articles 20 and 21 of the Convention outline the rules regulating the 
acceptance of or objection to permissible reservations, yet nowhere does it stipulate any 
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rules relating to impermissible reservations. Does this means that Articles 20 and 21 
apply equally to impermissible reservations? One would argue not, as such a conclusion 
would entirely negate the very notion of an impermissible reservation: states cannot be 
free to accept those reservations which fall foul of the Article 19 criteria: to reach any 
other conclusion would be tantamount to telling states that even if they formulate a 
reservation which flatly contradicts the most fundamental principles of the treaty, they 
will nevertheless be entitled to benefit from it in its entirety, quite irrespective of the fact 
that it is invalid and not permitted under international law.354  
 
What, then, is the most appropriate course of action in the case of illegal reservations? 
The answer seems to be a moot point, with very contrasting implications for the 
universality of rights. While the Vienna Convention is mute on the issue, the Genocide 
Convention case which preceded its drafting dealt with it directly. According to the 
International Court, states may accept compatible – or minor – reservations; 
reservations deemed impermissible however, are not capable of acceptance. Rather, any 
state that enters an incompatible reservation simply “cannot be regarded as being a 
party to the convention”.355 The traditional approach to tackling invalid reservations is 
therefore to negate the act of ratification: to remove the reserving state from treaty 
relations entirely. This appears to be based on the inviolable principle of state consent, 
expressly recognised by the International Court when it commented that “in treaty 
relations, a state cannot be bound without its consent”.356 Thus, a state which does not 
consent to the provisions of a treaty – evidenced by a failure to ratify the relevant 
instrument – is simply not bound by that treaty. Similarly, a state which assigns limits on 
its consent to be bound by expressly entering (permissible) reservations to treaty 
provisions cannot be regarded as having consented to being bound by those reserved 
provisions. Therefore, says the United Kingdom, “a State which purports to ratify a 
human rights treaty subject to a reservation which is fundamentally incompatible with 
participation in the treaty regime cannot be regarded as having become a party at 
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Reservations are therefore generally deemed to be integral to a states consent to be 
bound by a treaty. The United States has explicitly confirmed that its reservations 
entered upon ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
constitute an essential element of its consent to be bound by the Covenant. Should any 
of these reservations be deemed invalid, the United States has adamantly asserted that 
the ratification as a whole should be considered annulled.358 Marks recognises this 
position when she argues that a state which has qualified its consent to be bound by 
entering a reservation fundamentally at odds with the object and purpose of the treaty is 
unlikely to have intended its act of ratification to prevail over its intention to enter the 
invalid reservation.359 Indeed, as Bowett notes, when a state enters a reservation which 
is totally incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention, the reservation 
should be presumed to invalidate the states acceptance as the will to become a member 
is, in all likelihood, outweighed by its will to condition its acceptance by way of the 
impermissible reservation.360 The reservation entered by Saudi Arabia to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child is a case in point: although widely considered to be contrary 
to the object and purpose of the treaty, it is difficult to conceive that Saudi Arabia does 
not consider it as essential to its consent to be bound. This is reinforced by examining 
the reservations entered to the further three treaties it has ratified; both the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women361 and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination362 are reserved to the extent 
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that they will not apply if they are in conflict with the precepts of Islamic Shari‟a. Only 
the Convention against Torture does not contain a similar statement. If Saudi Arabia 
considers these reservations essential to its consent to be bound by the treaty, in line 
with general international law Saudi Arabia should no longer be considered a party to 
the relevant treaty(s) at all. 
 
5.4 Severance and its Merits 
 
Bearing in mind the supposed universality of rights however, and the United Nations 
continued push to secure this, perhaps the traditional approach is not the most 
beneficial in the realm of international human rights. The Human Rights Committee has 
certainly argued that as human rights treaties are a special type of international 
instrument – penetrating the state veil and proclaiming rights which must be “ensured 
to all those under a states party's jurisdiction”363 – the “classic rules on reservations [are] 
inadequate”.364 Academics have likewise argued that the traditional rules should be cast 
aside in favour of a solution which is more preferential to the advancement of universal 
human rights. Traditional rules on reservations are, after all, very state centric in light of 
the fact that the only actors in traditional international law have been nations 
themselves. Not so with human rights, and thus the “individualist and contractualist”365 
approach which typifies the regulation of reservations is arguably entirely inappropriate 
in this regard. Thus, there has been a move towards severing impermissible reservations: 
considering them to be legally null and void.366 The most significant contribution to this 
debate is General Comment 24, issued by the Human Rights Committee, which is 
responsible for overseeing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 
what appears to be a rather innocuous statement nestled in the depths of the General 
Comment the Committee declares that “[t]he normal consequence of an unacceptable 
reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party. 
Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will 
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be operative for the reserving party without the benefit of the reservation”.367  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Human Rights Committee appears anxious to move away from the 
potential of invalid reservations negating a states acceptance of the treaty in its entirety: 
it is better to have a state party to the treaty and subject to international scrutiny, than 
excluded and beyond the reach of the international community. Moreover, the 
traditional approach severely compromises the universality of human rights norms as it 
purports to remove a state from the treaty regime in its entirety, and citizens of that 
state will be deprived of rights (albeit perhaps limited rights) that they previously 
enjoyed. This is particularly true for monist states such as the Netherlands, which 
guarantee treaty rights through the international instrument itself, as opposed to 
through domestic law. For such states, expulsion from the treaty regime would result in 
the indefinite suspension of these international rights.  
 
Consequently, the Human Rights Committee has embraced an alternative which has 
already been exercised regionally by the European Court of Human Rights. Severance, 
whereby an invalid reservation is excised from the act of ratification, leaves the 
reserving state party to the treaty but without the benefit of the reservation. In the 
Belilos case368 the European Court severed Switzerland‟s reservation to Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention, holding that the reservation was of a general character as it 
was too vague to enable its exact meaning to be determined with certainty and was thus 
in violation of Article 64(1) of the European Convention.369 This was despite the fact 
that the interpretative declaration (as Switzerland had called it) was presented as being a 
condition of ratification. The Court dismissed this argument, however, and asserted that 
the invalidity of the reservation would in no way impinge upon Switzerland‟s continuing 
participation in the Convention as it firmly believed that “Switzerland is, and regards 
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itself as, bound by the Convention irrespective or the validity of the declaration”.370 
Switzerland did not take kindly to this, and threatened to withdraw from the 
Convention completely as a result of the Court‟s action.371 The Court was later 
vindicated, however narrowly, when a proposal to withdraw from the Convention was 
debated and defeated in the Swiss Parliament.372 This supports Redgewell's argument 
that, more often than not, the desire to remain a member of the treaty will supersede the 
necessity of maintaining an invalid reservation.373 
 
Following General Comment Number 24 some states, in particular the Nordic States, 
have embraced the notion of severance, asserting that the desired result of their 
objection to an impermissible reservation is that the reserving state will be considered to 
be a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation. Sweden is one such state 
which has adopted this stance in response to the reservation entered by Saudi Arabia to 
the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The reservation 
states that “in case of contradiction between any term of the Convention and the norms 
of Islamic law, the Kingdom is not under obligation to observe the contradictory terms 
of the convention”.374 This reservation was widely objected to, and the Swedish 
Government stated not only that the objection would not preclude the entry into force 
of the treaty, but further it would enter into force in its entirety “without the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia benefiting from the said reservation”.375  
 
Goodman believes that this act of severance is the ideal solution, not least of all for the 
reserving state. From the states perspective, it may very well be the case that it is in its 
own interests to remain party to the treaty, rather than endure the humiliation of being 
precluded from participation. To be oficially reproached and prevented from 
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maintaining treaty membership on account of its stance towards a particular aspect or 
aspects of the treaty would be to publicly tarnish its international reputation. Would it 
not rather maintain its appearance as a human rights defender through continued 
membership of the treaty? Appearances, after all, are vital given the potential benefits to 
be derived from formal participation in the human rights regime. Treaty membership 
should not be sacrificed lightly. By severing the reservation in the first instance, rather 
than expelling the state from membership immediately, the state is free to reach its own 
reasoned decision on the most appropriate course of action: whether it wants to remain 
party to the treaty or remove itself entirely. If the state objects to being bound by the 
previously reserved provision(s) it is free to voluntarily withdraw from the treaty regime 
at that stage.376 As was demonstrated by the Belilos case, it should not be presumed that 
severance of a reservation will automatically precipitate a withdrawal from the treaty: 
one should not underestimate the importance of treaty membership to a states own 
interests. 
 
From the perspective of advancing human rights protection severance is far more 
preferential than expulsion. It ensures as many states as possible remain party to the 
treaty regime, and therefore subject to international scrutiny: as has been said before, 
better to have a state under the watchful eye of the United Nations than not, despite the 
struggle it then faces in converting its wants into actions. 
 
Despite the seemingly logical arguments in favour of severance, both on the part of the 
individual state and the international community as a whole, that is not to say it has 
been welcomed with open arms by all concerned. While Nordic states have embraced 
the idea of nullifying the reservation rather than the ratification, this commendable 
stance has by no means been adopted by their counterparts. Quite the contrary: the 
attempt to shift international human rights law beyond the reservations regime 
applicable to public international law in general is viewed as an unacceptable assault on 
state consent, effectively aiming to usurp the sovereign will of states in acceding to 
international obligations. State consent informs the practice of expelling a state from the 
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treaty regime if it has entered an impermissible reservation which forms an essential 
element of its consent to be bound by the treaty. It similarly challenges the potential of 
severing an invalid reservation: when a state voluntarily accedes to the treaty regime, it 
may do so under limits it itself has assigned through reservations.377 Severance of a 
reservation by an external actor therefore blatantly opposes the principle of state 
consent as it results in the imposition of obligations upon a state in the absence of any 
prior agreement by that state to comply with such obligations. Consequently, it is not an 
option that the United States of America or the United Kingdom felt they could let 
pass. The United States replied to General Comment Number 24 condemning the 
possibility of severing an invalid reservation as “a legal fiction [which is] completely at 
odds with established legal practice and principles…”.378 The United Kingdom stated 
that it was simply unfeasible to attempt to hold a state to account for obligations which 
it self-evidently has not accepted, but which, on the contrary, it has expressed its 
decided unwillingness to accept.379 
 
Which will is most likely to prevail in practice? And what does this mean for the pursuit 
of universal human rights? One would like to believe that the position adopted by the 
United Nations human rights bodies and their Nordic allies would prevail. In terms of 
the importance of human rights to individuals the world over, such a robust approach 
designed to reduce the extremely detrimental consequences of impermissible 
reservations is both welcome and necessary. It sends a message to participating states 
that unacceptably broad reservations that fundamentally detract from the object and 
purpose of the treaty will not be tolerated. Yet one is inevitably disheartened by the 
reality of international human rights law. It is highly unlikely that this approach, 
heralded by both the treaty monitoring bodies and academics alike, will ever gain full 
effect in the face of opposition from the might of member states. No matter what the 
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supervisory bodies say, member states are not likely to act on it, if they do not wish to. 
That is, even if a reservation is struck down as a legal nullity, will the state necessarily 
take note? Will it be forced to change its ways as a result? After close consideration, one 
must inevitably conclude not: as explained below, compliance with international human 
rights obligations is disappointingly poor, governed not necessarily by international legal 
obligation but by a myriad of other factors which influence state behaviour. 
Compliance, as we shall see, is perhaps the United Nations ultimate failing in 





6 A QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE 
 
Poor compliance and weak international enforcement mechanisms deliver the final blow 
to the illusion of universal human rights. While the United Nations may preach the 
virtues of universal human rights, this means nothing if member states do not actively 
comply with their obligations. As Olara Otunnu notes, “the international community 
has done very well in elaborating norms, standards, and rules...But where we have not 
been effective is their application on the ground. Words on paper do not save a child in 
war”.380 Addo also succinctly explains the importance of implementation, stating:  
“The true value of the human rights strategy set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations lies in its effective implementation. In the absence of implementation, 
human rights remain little more than rhetorical promises. The point of 
implementation of human rights standards therefore marks a critical interface, 
between doctrine and reality, between rhetoric and action and between the 
priorities of national and international regimes. This is the stage at which the 
promises of human rights ideals mature into the reality of action and outcomes, 
and, therefore, the point of accountability”.381 
 
Despite the impressive rhetoric of universalism, it falls short at the final and most 
important hurdle: the transformation from rhetoric to reality. As Kofi Annan 
highlighted in his 2005 In Larger Freedom report, words alone are not enough: 
“…without implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action, our promises 
are meaningless”.382 If the United Nations human rights regime is to mean anything, 
member states must respect their treaty obligations.  
 
Unfortunately, compliance by state parties with the norms they have ratified is 
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notoriously poor: while members are keen to accept the advantages of association and 
regularly partake in idealistic rhetoric, when it comes to actions many are regrettably lax. 
As Secretary General Ban Ki-moon summed up: “the Declaration remains as relevant 
today as it did on the day it was adopted. But the fundamental freedoms enshrined in it 
are still not a reality for everyone. Too often, Governments lack the political will to 
implement international norms they have willingly accepted”.383 This chapter will 
therefore examine the complex issue of compliance, and its impact on the likelihood of 
realising universal human rights. Ultimately, it is submitted that compliance is a matter 
for national, as opposed to international, decision makers: while member states may re-
affirm the virtues of universal human rights through the official arena of the United 
Nations, domestically they may flout these very same norms, free from any significant 
international influence. Compliance is not determined solely by the existence of binding 
obligations, but is a more complex political decision influenced by many different 
factors, which will be examined below. Thus it seems the United Nations is unable to 
ensure that states comply with their human rights obligations, and consequently cannot 
ensure their universal applicability.  
 
6.1 The cost of universal ratification 
 
As alluded to in the foregoing chapters, it is reasonable to conclude that compliance is 
not an automatic consequence of ratification: ratification does not equal compliance. As 
explained earlier in this thesis, in a bid to promote human rights throughout the 
international community, the United Nations has pushed for widespread ratification of 
its treaties. The United Nations thinking seems to be that state parties would find 
themselves “ensnared”384 in an ever growing network of rights and obligations, which 
they would find difficult to evade. While the United Nations has garnered success in the 
push for universal ratification, with a large number of states now part of the 
international human rights treaty system, a presumption that this has had a substantial 
positive effect on international human rights protection seems naïve and optimistic. The 
act of ratification should not be taken as a definitive undertaking to comply with the 
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norms of the treaty. On the contrary, the suggestion that “for a great many states 
ratification has become an end in itself”385 as far as their international obligations are 
concerned, would seem to be a more accurate assessment.  
 
Professor Bayefsky is one commentator who has prominently criticised the United 
Nations approach to ratification, persuasively arguing that the cost of ratification has 
been compromised in the concerted effort to attract state parties. Ratification, it seems, 
has come at a price: “namely diminished obligations, lax supervision and few adverse 
consequences for non-compliance”.386 While the widely ratified human rights treaties 
produced by the United Nations may be claimed as a universal reflection of global 
agreement on human rights, the reality is that global human rights practice falls 
someway short of these treaty norms. While it would be satisfying to conclude that 
ratification entailed a resolve by states to comply with the treaty provisions, for many 
states acceptance is no more than a “paper promise”387; a symbolic gesture which 
confirms their place in the international community but which is, in fact, “totally devoid 
of substance”.388 Consequently, formal acceptance of treaty obligations does not 
necessarily equate to the furtherance of universal rights as ratification is not 
“synonymous with adherence to the procedures or substance of the treaty”.389 This is 
readily illustrated by reference to state practice in Cambodia. 
 
Cambodia has ratified six of the nine core human rights treaties, and is a signatory to a 
further two, yet violations of basic human rights are prevalent.390 Recent widespread 
forced evictions, which according to Amnesty International “are fast becoming one of 
the most widespread and systematic human rights violations affecting Cambodians”391 
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are an example of the Cambodian authorities failure to realise their international human 
rights obligations. Having ratified the core human rights treaties, in particular the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights which obliges members 
to take appropriate measures to ensure an adequate standard of living, which includes 
adequate housing,392 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which 
prohibits arbitrary interference with a persons privacy and family, and guarantees 
everyone the protection of law against such interferences,393 the Cambodian authorities 
are legally required to ensure that forced eviction is used only in “exceptional 
circumstances”394 and as a last resort after exploring alternative solutions. Cambodia has 
further guaranteed the force of law to these international commitments through Article 
31 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia.395 Despite this, Amnesty 
International concludes that “the Cambodian authorities are not only failing to protect – 
in law and in practice – its population against forced evictions, but are also actively 
involved in such acts, which contravene international law”.396 Having conducted 
extensive research, including field visits and interviews with evictees, it is clear from 
Amnesty‟s findings that the Cambodian authorities have failed to comply with their 
international treaty obligations. The evidence confirms they have also failed to follow 
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement 
prepared by the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, which were developed 
according to international standards to ensure that any evictions are lawful and carried 
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out in a manner consistent with human rights obligations.397  
 
The forced eviction of villagers from Sambok Chap is one example which demonstrates 
the failures of the authorities on many levels: there was no communication with the 
villagers prior to the evictions nor any information provided on how they may challenge 
the eviction; threats and intimidation were widespread, as was destruction of personal 
property; there was a lack of basic infrastructure or services at the resettlement site, 
which lacked sanitation, electricity, water or health services; children who had previously 
attended school have been unable to continue their education; and many evictees have 
been unable to sustain their livelihood having been moved a great distance from the 
original settlement site.398 The reason for the resettlement? Because the shelters of the 
settlement “pollute our city's beauty”,399 according to Phnom Penh's municipal 
governor Kep Chuktema. Does this constitute an exceptional circumstance in which 
forced eviction may be legal? One would tend to doubt it. Violence, destruction of 
property and an overwhelming sense of helplessness, with villagers kept in the dark over 
virtually all aspects of the proposed evictions, from their legal rights to the reason 
underlying the decision to resettle, are characteristic of a spate of forced evictions 
throughout Cambodia since 2005. 
 
Yet this is only one example from one member state of a failure to comply with their 
assumed human rights obligations. Many more occur daily. Amnesty Internationals 
annual human rights report confirms that the 1948 promises are not yet a 2008 reality. 
In fact, far from it: the pledges made in the Universal Declaration are violated with 
depressing regularity.400 Hathaway, following an extensive investigation into treaty 
membership, concludes that forty percent of the countries in which torture is reported 
to be widely practiced have, in fact, ratified the Convention against Torture, while the 
Special Rapporteur on Slavery confirms that “slavery is not history…today more than 
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27 million men, women, boys and girls who live their every day in slavery or slavery-like 
conditions”.401 Thus, Hathaway concludes that “it remains the case that large numbers 
of countries with the worst human rights practices are members of treaty regimes that 
prohibit the practices in which they engage”.402 It is evident, therefore, that despite the 
fact that ratification signifies the moment at which a state “establishes on the 
international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty”,403 it does not necessary 
represent some sort of magic moment whereby the state suddenly mends its ways and 
abides absolutely with its commitments. According to Henkin, therefore, adoption of 
any or all of the treaties does not necessarily entail “a resolve by member nations to 
change or mend their ways”.404 This is a most depressing realisation: the outlook for 
universal human rights is bleak to say the least. In order to understand such flagrant 
disregard for international human rights law, one must consider two interrelated issues. 
First, one must establish why states sign up to human rights treaties in the first place. 
Second, one must ask why, regardless of the states intentions in signing up to the treaty, 
they are then able to blatantly disregard their assumed obligations. From the answers to 
these enquiries, it becomes obvious that human rights are far from becoming the 
universally respected and applied standards the United Nations aspires to. 
 
6.2 The Ratification Motivation: Realist, not Idealist 
 
The question of why states sign up to human rights treaties is complicated by the age 
old nemesis of human rights: state sovereignty. Sovereignty, as was discussed earlier in 
this thesis, is hugely important to and fiercely protected by states. Why then would they 
submit to an international treaty? On the face of it, ratification imposes a significant 
burden on the ratifying state, compromising the states sovereignty by inviting external 
intrusion in internal affairs. When a state ratifies a treaty, it “assume[s] obligations and 
duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfill human rights...[and] 
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Governments undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible 
with their treaty obligations and duties”.405 Clearly, given the ramifications of treaty 
membership, ratification is not a step which should be taken lightly. A ratifying state is 
giving explicit consent to the international community to inspect its relationship with its 
citizens, and hold it accountable to external human rights standards.406 This, as has 
already been established, goes against all settled norms of international behaviour. 
Moreover, the rationale behind ratification becomes ever more puzzling when one 
considers the lack of reciprocity which characterises human rights treaties. A state will 
not gain any formal reciprocal benefit by joining a human rights treaty: the United 
Kingdom, for example, gains little tangible benefit from Columbia promising its citizens 
the right to enjoy the benefits of trade unions membership, free from undue 
interference.407 If a state receives no reciprocal benefit by ratifying a treaty, what is their 
motivation for doing so?  
 
When one poses the question of why states sign up to an international human rights 
treaty, the obvious answer would be that they do so because they agree with the treaty's 
principles. As ratification is voluntary, it would seem logical that a state would only bind 
itself by something with which it agrees. Moreover, pacta sunt servanda – “every treaty 
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith”408 – would seem to dictate that the ratifying state fully intended to honor its 
assumed legally binding obligations. Thus the idealist normative view of ratification 
would indicate a genuine commitment to human rights is the sole motivating force 
underlying the decision to ratify.409 Under this view, only those states that seriously 
intended to fulfill their human rights obligations would even consider ratifying the 
treaties: states that had little or no intention of abiding by these standards would not 
even contemplate it. Yet this is not necessarily the case, and such superficial reasoning 
ignores a rather more complicated relationship between ratification and compliance. It 
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does not explain why states with poor human rights records sign up to treaties, while 
other states with markedly better human rights records may fail to do so.410 Nor does it 
recognise that, despite the binding character of international human rights treaties, 
ratification does not necessarily entail compliance: the fact that the treaty is legally 
binding does not, in itself, ensure that states comply with its terms. Ultimately, the issue 
of compliance is far more complicated than a simple question of being legally bound by 
a treaty.  
 
If ratification is capable of imposing such a significant burden on the ratifying state, and 
the decision to ratify is not based solely on an idealist commitment to advancing human 
rights, what motivates a state to sign up? As noted in the earlier part of this thesis, states 
which have ratified human rights treaties may nevertheless question the legitimacy of 
their principles on grounds of cultural insensitivity, and thus one wonders why they 
would sign up in the first place. The answer lies in the realisation that ratification is not 
only capable of imposing a burden on the state, but also has the capacity to confer 
correlative benefits. Ultimately, the state must make an assessment of the relative costs 
and benefits associated with ratification. That is, while there is a potentially significant 
cost to the state, the issue arises of whether the benefits the state would derive from 
ratification would outweigh these costs.411 Once such a calculation is undertaken, it 
becomes clear that ratification is less likely to signify an idealist commitment to human 
rights than it is to be motivated by political self interest. Ratification is no more than a 
political tool employed in an attempt to secure a strong and respected stance in the 
international community, which is crucial to a state‟s own interests412: a state will be 
wary of openly dissenting from international consensus on human rights standards, as 
to do so may cost it its place in international diplomacy.413 Political expediency requires 
states to associate themselves with favourable human rights standards, quite irrespective 
of their actual or intended human rights practices, and ratification provides “surface 
evidence of commitment to the norms embedded in the treaties [which can be used to] 
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placate more genuinely interested parties to which they must answer”.414 Hathaway, 
following an extensive investigation into ratification and compliance with human rights 
treaties, argues that states are effectively rewarded for their position, rather than their 
practice: in other words, a state may derive benefits from its appearance as a nation 
committed to human rights standards, without necessarily improving its human rights 
standards.415 When considered in this light, a decision to ratify seems the obvious 
choice: it makes sense that a state would seek to secure a most favourable position for 
itself in international relations, and in this respect, being able to hold itself up as having 
committed to important international human rights standards is likely to prove a crucial 
tool. After all, surely a state that has formally adopted such a treaty will be viewed more 
positively than a state that has openly questioned and rejected those same norms.  
 
And with this realisation, the mystery behind the unfulfilled rhetoric of universal human 
rights unravels further: as ratification is not solely determined by a genuine commitment 
to a treaty's principles, but is instead perhaps no more than a disingenuous act of a self-
interested state, the fact that the United Nations has so far failed to live up to its 
universal pledges comes as no surprise. Ultimately, as Bayefsky accurately contends, 
ratification has become “a means to easy accolades for empty gestures”,416 which 
accords with Hathaway‟s conclusion that there is “not a single treaty for which 
ratification seems to be reliably associated with better human rights practices...”.417 Such 
a conclusion deals a severe blow to the aspirations of the United Nations human rights 
regime. If this statement is accurate, then the supposed universality of human rights is 
nothing more than a misnomer. Clearly, if there is such a compliance deficit, the 
rhetoric of universal human rights remains but a forlorn aspiration, far from becoming a 
practical reality despite promising ratification statistics.  
 
So why, then, does such a compliance deficit exist? What leads Hathaway to conclude 
that there is no reliable correlation between ratification and compliance? Why are states 
                                                 
414 Hathaway, O.A [2002]. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 111. 
2002. Pg. 1935 at 2008/9; Hathaway, O.A [2003(a)]. Op. Cit.  Pg 185 at Pg. 196. 
415 Hathaway, O.A [2003(b)]. Op. Cit.  Pg.101 at 119. 
416 International Law Association. International Law Association Report on the Treaty System. Op. Cit.  
417 Hathaway, O.A [2002]. Op. Cit.  Pg. 1935 at 1940. 
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able to benefit from ratification without having to undergo any corresponding 
improvement in human rights practice? This inevitably stems from the very nature of 
international human rights law, and the extent to which the United Nations as an 
international organisation, can be expected to ensure compliance. By considering the 
primary tools at the disposal of the United Nations – in particular the treaty monitoring 
bodies and the procedures of the recently created Human Rights Council – it is evident 
that the ability of an international body to perform this task is limited at best. With the 
creation of the Human Rights Council there is hope for the future, but much lies in the 
hands of member states: if they fail to take their responsibilities seriously, there will be 
little progress despite the new machinery. The decision on whether to comply with 
international human rights obligations is a national concern, and thus the ability to 
ensure human rights norms are universally respected is somewhat outwith the grasp of 
the United Nations. As will be argued below, compliance is determined not by the 
United Nations, but by a range of factors which ultimately affect a states own interests. 
Thus, the United Nations is apparently doomed to fall at the final, and most important, 
hurdle in the path from universal ideals to practical outcomes.  
 
Due to the nature of international law, and the omnipresent importance of state 
sovereignty, the supervisory organs of the United Nations have been deliberately 
created by member states with a subsidiary, non judicial character. While states may 
voluntarily sign up to the treaty system, they nevertheless remain reticent about the 
prospect of having their domestic affairs subjected to international investigation: the 
ability of an external body to pronounce judgement on matters traditionally within a 
states domestic jurisdiction does not sit favourably. Thus, while states may have 
voluntarily accepted the creation of a system of treaty monitoring through independent 
experts, it has been solely on their pre-determined terms: in practice, states have handed 
over little authority to these supra-national organs. 
 
The United Nations therefore plays a subsidiary, non judicial, role in the 
implementation of human rights nationally. First and foremost, responsibility for 
implementing and enforcing human rights lies with the national institutions of each 
member state. While this arrangement is a pragmatic solution to the interplay between 
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sovereignty of states and human rights, it is also hoped that conferring prime 
responsibility on individual members will encourage the internalisation of treaty norms, 
such that they become ingrained into the fabric of society. Koh argues it is this process 
of integration which will ultimately improve the likelihood of the state complying with 
its international obligations in the longterm.418 Thus, while member states remain 
ultimately responsible, faithful implementation of human rights obligations is not always 
forthcoming. To complement the national implementation of norms, the United 
Nations organs therefore participate in the promotion of human rights by supervising 
states and monitoring their levels of compliance, through two principle mechanisms: the 
treaty monitoring bodies and the Charter based Human Rights Council. 
 
6.3 Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
 
Let us first consider the United Nations primary mechanism for monitoring human 
rights compliance: the treaty monitoring bodies. From this consideration, it will become 
apparent that this system is not only ill equipped but totally unable to ensure the 
realisation of universal rights. As the name suggests, each of the United Nations core 
human rights treaties has a corresponding body of independent experts entrusted with 
monitoring the implementation of their respective treaties throughout member states.419 
Unfortunately, however, the capacity of the monitoring bodies to hold states to account 
to their assumed human rights norms simply does not exist. 
 
As subsidiary institutions, the treaty monitoring bodies are designed to assist states in 
complying with their international obligations, rather than acting as an “intrusive 
enforcement body”420 with the power to issue binding decisions. While the subsidiarity 
of international supervision is an inescapable consequence of national sovereignty, its 
effectiveness as a mechanism by which states can be coerced into compliance depends, 
                                                 
418 Koh, H.H [1996/7]. Op. Cit.  Pg. 2599 at 2603. 
419 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Human Rights Bodies. [online] 
URL: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. Accessed 09/12/2008. The 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance is not yet in force 
and thus the corresponding monitoring body is not yet in existence. 
420 Mutua, M. Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-Marginalizing 
Enforcement. Buffalo Human Rights Law Review. 1998. Vol. 4. Pg. 211 at 232. 
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paradoxically, on the very states under review. That is, the goodwill of national 
governments, or lack of it, fundamentally determines whether human rights ideals 
progress to practical outcomes; whether human rights transform from rhetoric to 
reality. The United Nations supervisory bodies primarily carry out their function 
through a system of state reporting and individual communications. As we shall see 
from the examination which follows, however, neither of these can be relied on as an 
effective means of ensuring the realisation of treaty rights.  
 
The state reporting system was designed to act as an aid to both member states and 
monitoring bodies alike. The Committee which oversees the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated in its General Comment Number 1 that 
“the reporting obligations which are contained in…the Covenant are designed 
principally to assist each state party in fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant…”.421 
Periodic reporting is considered to be a vital mechanism in encouraging states to 
comply with their international obligations by allowing them to take stock of what has 
been achieved and assess what yet remains to be done: “recognition of rights on paper 
is not sufficient to guarantee that they will be enjoyed in practice”422 and the treaty 
monitoring system, in theory, has a key role to play in transforming the universal ideals 
codified in the treaties into a reality. As explained by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, treaty monitoring should facilitate the advancement of 
human rights standards by developing a states understanding of its obligations, 
highlighting the progress made as well as the challenges and shortcomings faced in the 
implementation of these standards, and bringing these matters to bear in the public 
arena.423 In practice, however, it is fraught with problems. The extent to which it may be 
deemed effective is therefore debateable.  
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The first problem with state reporting lies in the fact that committees are empowered 
only to consider the information contained in the report presented by the state. The 
report is intended to be a candid self evaluation of “the legal, administrative and judicial 
measures taken by the state to give effect to the treaty provisions [as well as] any factors 
or difficulties that have been encountered in implementing the rights”.424 In reality, 
however, it is more likely to be utilised as an opportunity for shameless self-promotion: 
it is a rare state indeed that will critically assess its own practices when it has the chance 
to promote a more favourable picture instead. The content of state reports therefore 
impedes the ability of the monitoring committees to undertake their task in overseeing 
human rights compliance, as they do not have the capacity to probe behind the official 
account prepared by the state. A state report simply cannot be taken as an accurate 
depiction of its actual human rights practice. Myanmar‟s state report to the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, for example, has the audacity to claim that “there are no 
children involved in armed conflict”,425 when it is well known that this is far from 
accurate. The true situation is quite the opposite, with more than twenty five percent of 
the three hundred thousand suspected child soldiers participating in armed conflict 
around the globe forcibly conscripted to both national and non-state armies.426 For the 
Myanmarese authorities to claim otherwise demonstrates an irreverent disregard for 
their reporting obligations. 
 
Secondly, the submission of a report – regardless of its content – is by no means 
guaranteed. In fact, a huge number of states regularly fail to fulfil their reporting 
obligations, which is even more disappointing. Liberia, for example, was due to submit 
                                                 
424 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty System: An introduction to the core human rights treaties and the treaty bodies. Fact Sheet Number 30. [online] URL: 
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its initial report on the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination in 1977, but even now has so far failed to submit any of the sixteen 
reports required since the Convention entered force in the country in 1976.427 It is 
therefore thirty years in arrears, and the Committee is yet to consider a single report. 
When one undertakes an assessment of the cost involved in reporting compared to the 
consequences of failing to, it is clear that reporting is simply not deemed to be a priority 
for states, and thus the entire system is characterised by delinquency: at the start of 2005 
just shy of fifteen hundred reports were overdue, with six hundred and forty eight of 
them overdue for more than five years, and thus “the average state party to a treaty with 
reporting requirements has more than eleven reports overdue to the treaty bodies”.428 
 
The reporting burden on states is great: if a state has ratified all of the core human rights 
treaties – as the United Nations so vociferously urges – it is potentially expected to 
produce as many as twenty seven reports over a ten year period: this is clearly an 
enormous undertaking. Of course, production of the report is not the end; on the 
contrary, it is very often only the beginning of a long and arduous process. The state 
may also be asked to produce responses to a list of issues raised by the committee; to 
attend the treaty body session; and to submit a further report on the measures taken to 
follow up the concluding observations of the committee, for each treaty it has ratified. 
In addition, other (non-core) human rights treaties such as the European Social Charter 
also require states to submit regular reports.429 The burden on states is therefore 
substantial.  
 
The paradox to this is that there are very few cost consequences associated with a failure 
to report. For many states, reporting is simply not viewed as a priority because the cost 
to consequence ratio simply does not warrant it. There is effectively nothing a treaty 
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monitoring body can do to compel a state to report, and there are no means of 
censuring a delinquent state for failing to.430 They have no power to impose sanctions 
on a defaulting state, for example. At worst, they may threaten to consider the state in 
abstentia, in an attempt to provoke it into a response.431 They can do no more.  
 
This lead the Independent Expert to note with concern that “large scale non-reporting 
makes a mockery of the reporting system as a whole. It leads to a situation in which 
many States are effectively rewarded for violating their obligations while others are 
penalised for complying…”.432  Those states which are willing to comply with their 
international human rights obligations by permitting a supranational body to closely 
scrutinise their human rights practices are essentially being punished when the treaty 
bodies find fault. On the other hand, some of the most repressive regimes which 
flagrantly abuse human rights and ignore their reporting obligations escape comment. 
This has inevitably resulted in a situation “in which a diminishing number of States will 
report very regularly and others will almost never do so”433:  the incentive pull for 
complying with arduous reporting obligations is weakening all the while.  
 
If a state does submit a report, how is this information utilised in the furtherance of 
human rights? Ultimately, the consideration of the report results in the Committee 
issuing its Concluding Observations on the human rights practice of the state 
concerned. These concluding observations outline the concerns and recommendations 
of the Committee in response to the state report, and are intended to act as a basis for 
the enhanced implementation of treaty rights in the future. However, given the non-
judicial nature of the United Nations organs, the concluding observations of the 
Committee do not constitute a binding determination with which the state can be 
compelled to comply. Rather, as the Committees attempt to monitor implementation 
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via a system of state reporting, they adopt the language of diplomacy. This “constructive 
dialogue”, reflective of the bodies non-judicial nature, assists the treaties bodies in their 
fundamental aim of working with member states and avoids the process deteriorating 
into a hostile, confrontation stand-off. Unfortunately, the upshot is that the concluding 
observations are more reminiscent of a feeble and desperate plea to the state rather than 
an authoritative assessment. Treaty bodies are able to “encourage”434 or even “urge”435 a 
state to comply with its obligations, but should it fail to do so, the most severe 
reprimand the delinquent state is likely to face is an expression of the “deep regret”436 or 
“concern”437 of the treaty body.  
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child for example, when considering the human 
rights record of Myanmar, concluded simply that it was “extremely concerned”438 about 
the widespread use of child soldiers by both Government and other forces, despite the 
fact that the forced conscription of child soldiers has been an ongoing problem in the 
country and one which obviously has devastating consequences for the children 
concerned. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
meanwhile, “recommend[ed]” that Malian authorities increase efforts “to eliminate the 
practice of female genital mutilation”.439 Female genital mutilation, as was discussed in 
chapter three, is one of the most severe and brutal violations of women‟s rights: a 
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“recommendation” to a state which even the Committee notes demonstrates a 
“reluctance to expedite the adoption of legislation aimed at eradicating this violation of 
women‟s rights”440 hardly seems sufficient. Moreover, as Kofi Annan made clear in his 
In Larger Freedom report, the state reporting process is “weakened… by poor 
implementation of recommendations”.441 The fact is that governments have “not found 
it particularly painful”442 to simply ignore, without consequence from the United 
Nations, the observations made by the monitoring bodies. This leads Donoho to 
conclude that it would be “somewhat of a misnomer” to consider the work of the treaty 
bodies as a means of enforcement at all: it is merely a mechanism for moral suasion that 
cannot be relied upon to compel delinquent states into honouring their obligations.443 
The state reporting system is certainly not, of itself, a plausible means of converting the 
theory of universal human rights into practice given that it is not capable of ensuring 
compliance with treaty norms. 
 
So what of the effectiveness of the individual communications procedure? Surely 
enabling an individual to bring an alleged violation of his or her human rights to the 
attention of the monitoring committee is an effective means of supervising human 
rights compliance? Potentially, yes. But the ability of an individual to raise a 
communication is by no means automatic, which in itself hinders its usefulness as a 
means of ensuring the realisation of human rights throughout the international 
community. States must formally opt in by making a declaration recognising the 
competence of the committee in this regard. The number of states that have done so, 
however, is disappointing: for all but one444 of the treaties with an associated complaint 
procedure, the take up by states party to the treaty is less than half. The decision to 
commit to the individual communication procedure is of course not one to be made 
lightly, not least of all because it essentially seeks to create a “double standard of 
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adherence”445 to treaty rights, subjecting member states to a greater degree of supra-
national scrutiny than non-members. However, as with concluding observations, the 
views formulated by the Committees are non-binding and there is no enforcement 
procedure. Thus, yet again, the implementation of the committees views relies on the 
goodwill of member states: it is those who stand accused of perpetrating their violation 
that are ultimately responsible for remedying the wrongdoing.446 
 
Despite the non binding nature of treaty body output, the work of the treaty bodies has 
become increasingly sophisticated since their creation, and through their output they 
have made a “significant contribution”447 to the promotion and protection of human 
rights over the years. An International Law Association study conducted to document 
the extent to which the work of the treaty bodies had begun to have an impact on the 
work of national courts and tribunals found that Governments accept that “the views, 
concluding observations and comments, and general comments and recommendations 
of the treaty bodies are to be accorded considerable importance as the pronouncement 
of a body expert in the issues covered by the treaty…”448 and, in general, courts have 
noted that the findings of the treaty bodies can be relevant and useful in assisting 
national courts or tribunals in their tasks.449 For example, the Federal Court of Australia 
has previously stated that “although the views of the [Human Rights] Committee lack 
precedential authority in an Australian court, it is legitimate to have regard to them as 
the opinions of an expert body established by the treaty to further its objects…”.450 
 
However, states have been keen to discredit the status of views. While national courts 
have demonstrated that they are generally willing to accept that the opinion of such 
expert bodies should be afforded a certain weight, state sovereignty dictates that they 
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consistently refuse to accept they are formally obliged to follow Committee output as 
binding interpretations of the treaty. Indeed, Indeed, Fennelly J, delivering judgement of 
the Supreme Court of Ireland, concluded that “[t]he notion that the "views" of a 
Committee even of admittedly distinguished experts on international human rights, 
though not necessarily lawyers, could prevail against the concluded decision of a 
properly constituted court is patently unacceptable”.451  
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, compliance with Committee views is often wholly 
unsatisfactory, demonstrated by the failure of the Spanish Constitutional Court to give 
effect to an adverse finding by the Human Rights Committee in Gómez Vázquez v 
Spain,452 when it was held that the Spanish Criminal Procedure Act violated Article 
14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.453 The Report of the 
Human Rights Committee produced in 2006 states that in four hundred and twenty 
nine views out of the five hundred and forty seven adopted since 1979, they have 
concluded that there has been a violation of the Covenant.454 However, information 
requested by the Committee to show what the state has done to comply with the views 
in which a violation had been found indicates that less than ten percent have resulted in 
a satisfactory outcome,455 satisfactory being classed as those cases whereby the state 
concerned “display[s] the willingness… to implement the Committee‟s 
recommendations or to offer the complainant an appropriate remedy”.456 The individual 
communications system therefore falls someway short of its intended objectives, and 
contributes to the continued failure to secure universal human rights. 
 
6.4 The Human Rights Council 
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Perhaps the most promising measure taken to improve the effectiveness of human 
rights treaties is the recent creation of the Human Rights Council, which is responsible 
for promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms without 
distinction; addressing situations of human rights violations; and promoting the 
effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights throughout the UN 
system.457 The Human Rights Council replaced the discredited Commission on Human 
Rights, which had been “increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and 
professionalism [given that] States... sought membership of the Commission not to 
strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize 
others. As a result, a credibility deficit... developed, which cast[.] a shadow on the 
reputation of the United Nations system as a whole”.458  
 
The international community should be applauded for the assertiveness it showed in 
creating the Human Rights Council, which indicated a renewed push to increase the 
prominence of human rights in international relations by affording them the same status 
as the United Nations two other foundational pillars; development and security.459 
Indeed, its creation was accompanied by great optimism for the future; a renewed belief 
in the imperative obligation to advance human rights standards throughout the world, 
with members undertaking to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and 
protection of human rights”.460 In performing its role as guardian of human rights, the 
Council has three main mechanisms: it has assumed the special procedures of the 
Commission; holds regular sessions which allow it to deal with actual and emerging 
human rights situations; and undertakes a new universal periodic review mechanism.  
 
Much optimism surrounds the potential of universal periodic review in holding states to 
account over their human rights obligations, which Human Rights Watch claims 
“presents a historic opportunity for strengthening the promotion and protection of 
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human rights”.461 Certainly, the success or failure of the universal periodic review 
mechanism will be critical in determining whether the Human Rights Council makes a 
positive contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights throughout the 
international community. Universal periodic review is an evaluation, based on objective 
and reliable information “of the fulfillment by each state of its human rights obligations 
and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal 
treatment with respect to all states”.462 Thus, all United Nations member states will be 
subject to scrutiny by the Human Rights Council. This addresses a key criticism of the 
Commission, which was that members would use their position on the Commission as a 
means of shielding themselves from scrutiny. There will be no such possibility under the 
new system created by the Council: no state will be beyond the eye of the Council, and 
members will be reviewed during their term of membership. Thus, Secretary General 
Ban Ki-moon has said that the universal periodic review mechanism “has great potential 
to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world”.463 
 
The extent to which the Council engages with interested stakeholders such as national 
NGO's and human rights institutions is perhaps the most important factor in 
determining the success of universal periodic review as a means of promoting respect 
for universal human rights. The inevitable weakness with the system is that, necessarily, 
implementation lies in the hands of the state subject to review: just as with the treaty 
monitoring bodies and the Commission before it, the Council has no means of 
sanctioning a state which fails to act on the recommendations of its review. What is to 
stop a state blithely shrugging aside the review outcome without further thought? Quite 
simply, it is the activism of national bodies dedicated to promoting human rights which 
is likely to prove most instrumental in this respect. The Human Rights Council must 
work closely with relevant parties to ensure that the actual human rights situation of the 
country is improved following review: an outcome document will mean little in 
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isolation, if it is not supported by action.464 
 
Universal period review therefore has the potential to further the progression of 
universal human rights from words to actions. The challenge is to ensure this potential 
is realised. In addition to universal periodic review the Human Rights Council has 
assumed the special procedures of the Commission, which enables the Council to 
address both thematic and country specific human rights issues as and when required.465 
The ability of special procedures to raise awareness of important human rights issues 
throughout the world has the potential to be a vital tool in driving the wheels of 
change.466 Indeed, an NGO joint statement argues that  
“special procedures are at the core of the [United Nations] human rights 
machinery. They are among the most innovative, responsive and flexible tools of 
the human rights machinery, and they play a critical and often unique role in 
protecting and promoting human rights. Without independent and objective 
experts who are able to monitor and respond rapidly to allegations of violations 
occurring anywhere in the world, the ability of the [United Nations] – in particular 
the Human Rights Council - to respond to violations will be severely 
compromised”.467 
 
Yet these procedures, too, have failed to quite live up to their potential, and require 
revision and rationalisation in order that they “evolv[e.] into a truly systematic and 
professional system from responding to, and seeking to pre-empt or prevent, major 
human rights violation around the world”.468 The process of revision is ongoing, yet 
surely one of the most important factors to address is the effect of the independent 
experts report on the protection of human rights at national level. As the United 
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Nations itself admits, the special procedures mechanism is far from conclusive in 
improving human rights protection, given that action in response to a missions findings 
depends on a variety of factors: the attitude of national governments, the reaction of the 
international community to the national situation, and the activism of civil society in 
pursuing the cause. 469 Alston confirms that, too often in the past, Governments have 
viewed country visits as “the governmental equivalent of an unpleasant dental 
appointment which, once endured, can comfortably be forgotten”.470 This is not helped 
by the fact that the international community has not always best utilized the work of its 
rapporteurs. The possibility of violent ethnic erupting in Rwanda, for example, was 
highlighted by the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions 
prior to the genocide, but the international community failed to act on this early 
warning, with devastating consequences.471 The important work of special rapporteurs 
must be brought to bear at the conclusion of their mission, but one doubts whether the 
international community will have more success under the auspices of the Human 
Rights Council than under the discredited Commission. The consideration of why states 
comply with international human rights obligations reveals that the task of ensuring this 
is an inherently difficult one for an international organisation such as the United 
Nations to achieve. 
 
As with any international endeavour, the ability of the Human Rights Council to 
promote compliance with universal human rights ultimately lies in the hands of states 
themselves; their attitude towards assumed human rights commitments and their 
acceptance of the work of the Human Rights Council. While it would appear to be more 
aptly equipped than the treaty monitoring bodies in ensuring compliance, we must not 
forget that neither the treaty monitoring bodies nor the discredited Commission on 
Human Rights were designed to fail: it was member states that failed the Commission – 
and are failing the treaty monitoring bodies – by manipulating it to serve their own 
interests rather than furthering its proper purpose of defending human rights. The 
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success or failure of the Human Rights Council in promoting respect for universal 
human rights through its universal periodic review mechanism and its special 
procedures ultimately lies in the extent to which these tools are utilised to effectively 
pressure and influence national governments. As discussed below, compliance with 
international human rights is intricately linked with a states domestic and international 
concerns, not simply legal obligation. Thus, if these procedures are utilised effectively 
such that the state faces both domestic and international pressure to improve its human 
rights practices and comply with assumed obligations, the likelihood of achieving 
universal human rights shines far more brightly than at any time before. 
 
6.5 Why Comply? The Question of Compliance 
 
The question of compliance with international human rights obligations is a very 
complex one. It would be wrong to presume that a state will never comply with a legally 
non binding view, just as it would be naive to suppose that legally binding obligations 
will always be obeyed. If the gap between rhetoric and reality in international human 
rights is ever to been understood, let alone overcome, the inquiry into compliance is a 
vital one. When Louis Henkin claimed that "almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time”472 back in 1979, he was probably correct.473 But the fact is, in international human 
rights law in particular, many nations do not comply with many of their obligations 
much of the time. So why do some nations observe their international commitments 
while others disregard them? What motivates a state to respect, or conversely, violate 
promises made? It is the answer to this inquiry which is likely to uncover the most 
significant challenge faced by the United Nations in the quest to secure universal human 
rights. 
 
"The duties which [international law] imposes”, Austin wrote, "are enforced by moral 
sanctions: by fear on the part of nations...of provoking general hostility, and incurring 
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its probable evils, in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected".474 
This, though surmised almost two hundred years ago, still holds credence today: 
compliance with international law is largely dictated by concern over reputation. Thus, 
while undertaking a cost consequence calculation a state must have regard to the bigger 
picture, the fact that international human rights norms have become “nested within a 
much broader fabric of ongoing communal relations”475 such that a states actions with 
respect to human rights will have a continued effect on its wider interests. Thus, labeled 
the Cynics Formula, it is argued that human rights obligations will only be complied 
with by those “nation states acting out of transparent convenience or self interest”.476 
According to Louis Henkin, state sovereignty hinders the enforcement of international 
law as a state will only honour international obligations and, in the case of human rights 
submit to and comply with monitoring obligations, if to do so is in its own interests,477 
such that acceptance of a treaty is by no means synonymous with adherence to its 
standards. 
 
However, to simply conclude that international human rights law is absolutely 
determined by national self-interest would be incorrect: if states were purely acting out 
of their own concerns, irrespective of the bigger picture, the international human rights 
“regime” would be nothing more than an anarchic shambles.478 The fact is, the necessity 
of an international regime is indispensable: members recognise that a degree of co-
ordination and co-operation is required in order to facilitate international stability. Thus, 
those states which respect their international human rights obligations may be inclined 
to do so, perhaps even if to do so is inconvenient, because “they have a longer-term 
interest in the maintenance of law-impregnated international community”.479  
 
Yet a large part of the compliance question is nevertheless dominated by state interests 
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and reputation. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, the decision on whether to 
ratify an international human rights treaty is often heavily influenced by the cost 
involved in doing so: primarily, the likelihood of being forced to comply with their 
assumed obligations. In terms of human rights one must conclude that, in this sense, the 
costs are low: international institutions are ill-equipped to compel compliance, and the 
imposition of international sanctions for a violative human rights practice is unlikely in 
the extreme.480 The costs are therefore overwhelmingly reputational: how important is it 
that the state is seen by its peers as a human rights defender rather than an egregious 
violator? Hathaway believes that states may choose to comply in order to “obtain or 
maintain a reputation for compliance and hence good international citizenship”.481 
 
Given that human rights are able to significantly shape a states international, and 
domestic, reputation, Henkin believes "that nations act deliberately and rationally, after 
mustering carefully and weighing precisely all the relevant facts and factors [and] barring 
an infrequent non-rational act, nations will observe international obligations unless 
violation promises an important balance of advantage over cost".482 These factors are 
both internal and external. That is, the determination of what is in a states best interests 
will be fundamentally influenced by the domestic situation: the level of democratic, 
representative government, commitment to the rule of law, the strength of non-
governmental organisations and such like.483 One must therefore understand the 
domestic situation before attempting to interpret a states international behaviour484: 
domestic politics fundamentally inform a states actions on the world stage, and 
ultimately influences the level of compliance with legally binding but often easily 
ignored human rights obligations.  
 
The costs of membership are therefore likely to be felt more strongly by liberal, 
democratic Governments, as in such a state, the people are the de facto sovereign 
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power.485 Representing the will of the people, the Government is bound to be more 
responsive to its international obligations: the democratic state is structured so as to 
translate domestic interests into state actions, and the act of ratifying an international 
treaty triggers the mobilisation of domestic pressure groups which aim to coerce the 
Government into honouring its obligations.486 There is therefore a transformative 
power of human rights obligations when applied to a democratic Government: human 
rights obligations are undeniably persuasive ideals – which is why no nation is likely to 
reject the promises of the Universal Declaration – and thus when reinforced by strong 
activism they do have the power to transform and improve the practices of member 
states.487 Unfortunately, however, in the absence of democracy or the rule of law, states 
may nonchalantly disregard their promises, safe in the knowledge that neither their 
people nor their peers have the power – or the will – to oppose them.  
 
Herein lies universalisms insurmountable hurdle: compliance with international human 
rights, while legally binding, is never likely to be susceptible to effective international 
policing, and truly universal norms which match the utopian rhetoric are thus forever 
beyond the grasp of the United Nations. It is, inescapably, a domestic rather than 
international matter. There are clearly many factors which influence the decision on 
whether to comply with human rights obligations, but these presently come to bear 
outwith the orbit of the United Nations system. Thus it is here, in shaping domestic 
decision making, that the procedures of the recently created Human Rights Council 
could ultimately prove most beneficial in transforming legal obligations into tangible, 
universal outcomes. If the Human Rights Council is able to get under the skin of 
member states by effectively engaging with civil society, there must be hope for the 
future.488 Thus it is imperative the Council retains its credibility and avoids falling foul 
of the fate that befell its predecessor: if politics are sidelined in the name of genuine 
commitment to the goal of advancing human rights universally, the United Nations 
should slowly edge towards its utopian pledges. We must hope members grasp this 
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opportunity to take a stand in defence of human rights. It is too early to guess whether 
this is likely: one can only hope so. 
 
What does all this mean in practice? There is no escaping the fact that compliance with 
human rights obligations is, in the end, unacceptably dependent on the goodwill of 
individual member states. As Hathaway notes, “the major engines of compliance that 
exist in other areas of international law are for the most part absent in the area of 
human rights”489 and thus the noble aspirations of the United Nations are fatally 
undermined by the paradox of enforcement: the United Nations is powerless to compel 
compliance, and thus the furtherance of human rights relies on the goodwill of those 
accused of their violation, as they are the only ones with the power to remedy their 
wrongdoing. The United Nations treaty bodies cannot compel a state to comply with its 
findings, and consequently the furtherance of human rights hinges on the goodwill of 
the respondent state. Of course, in very limited circumstances the Security Council may 
intervene if the situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, but this 
is by no means a satisfactory solution. Given the extremely limited composition of the 
Security Council, it lacks objectivity and is inevitably motivated by politics rather than 
human rights. Consequently, it cannot be relied upon as an appropriate vessel to enforce 
human rights obligations, and nor should it be expected to undertake this task: a 
politically influenced body, let us not be duped into believing that its members will 
always have protection of human rights at the forefront of their agenda. And so it is that 
the most fundamental of the United Nations goals totally lacks effective international 
enforcement, and the universality of human rights hangs in the balance, with member 
states alone capable of tipping the scales in their favour. Unfortunately, this is an idealist 
system which cannot be relied upon in a less than ideal world; it has been proven an 
unrealistic aspiration in a world where goodwill of Governments is often sadly lacking. 
 
So what is the upshot? Violations occur with monotonous regularity and thus, the 
United Nations human rights regime has never quite lived up to its promises. Day after 
day, rights are violated with monotonous regularity throughout the international 
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community: from Guantanamo Bay, to Somalia, Zimbabwe, Cambodia and Columbia, 
to name but a few. On the anniversary of sixty long years since the Universal 
Declarations creation, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon solemnly reminded nations that, 
while “we have come a long way [we must] acknowledge the savage inhumanity that too 
many people in our world must endure”.490 This is a depressing but ultimately accurate 
realisation: while international human rights are heralded as the universal entitlements of 
the world‟s citizens, the truth is that these supposedly inalienable and inviolable rights 
remain but a forlorn aspiration for millions of the world‟s most impoverished. Yes, the 
rhetoric of universal human rights is persuasive and defensible: of course all people 
from all nations should be equally entitled and protected by the panoply of rights and 
obligations enshrined in the international human rights treaties. To claim otherwise 
would be to deny the fundamental equality of the human species. But this idealist vision 
remains unfulfilled. The sad fact is that universal human rights are not – yet – a reality.  
 
                                                 





7 THE RHETORIC BUT NOT THE REALITY OF UNIVERSAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The depressing conclusion one must inevitably draw from the foregoing consideration 
of universal human rights is that, in practice, the rhetoric simply does not depict the 
reality. This thesis has demonstrated that the United Nations is fluent in the rather 
empty rhetoric of universalism: as yet, however, it has failed to successfully transform 
this rhetoric into a practical reality. In fact, it seems that over the course of the six 
decades since the passing of the Universal Declaration, its aspirational pledges have 
fallen by the wayside, abused by Governments that “have shown more interest in the 
abuse of power or in the pursuit of political self-interest, than in respecting the rights of 
those they lead”.491 As the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
admitted, “although basic human rights principles enjoy universal agreement, the gap 
between rhetoric and reality is wide indeed”.492 One cannot ignore the persistent human 
rights violations which continue to blight the lives of millions around the globe, and 
which attest to the fact that, as yet, the United Nations remains some way short of 
satisfactorily achieving its goals. While the rhetoric is a proclamation of inalienable, 
inviolable entitlements, the reality is very often one of broken, unfulfilled promises. 
 
The founders of the United Nations showed commendable foresight and unity when 
they produced the landmark Declaration in 1948, committed to promoting “universal 
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.493  Despite the 
competing ideologies of the Cold War, the United Nations innovatively premised its 
extensive human rights regime on the universal applicability of the provisions it 
enshrined: the core human rights treaties seek to protect rights which should be 
universally enjoyed by individuals throughout the world without distinction, and which 
bind every nation party to them. As was argued in chapter two, the universality of rights 
is a sound platform on which to build the regime. Indeed, it is an inescapable pre-
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requisite: the conferral of rights without distinction is essential given that they derive 
from the dignity inherent in the human person.  As dignity attaches to all members of 
the human family, so too must human rights. If our world is to advance in any way, we 
must ensure human dignity is respected absolutely, of this there is no question: in order 
to protect dignity, one must protect human rights. It is through the protection of human 
rights that the value of the human person is allowed to flourish. Without doubt, human 
rights must be a universal enterprise. 
 
The United Nations, over the course of the six decades since the creation of the 
Universal Declaration in 1948, has been unrelenting in its bid to promote human rights. 
It has been equally insistent on the universality of these norms, taking advantages of the 
prominence of key events such as the 2005 World Summit to confirm that “the 
universal nature [of human rights] is beyond question”.494 Yet worlds alone fail to 
ensure actions; and promises count for little if their content is not realised. 
Commendable and defensible as it may be, one must ultimately recognise that the 
United Nations utopian rhetoric of universal rights is not fully supported by the reality 
of international human rights law. On the contrary; although the United Nations has 
managed to produce a number of treaties which confirm our entitlements, this is not to 
say that it has ensured they mean anything in practice. While the core human rights 
treaties have garnered widespread ratification this does not, in itself, prove the practical 
universality of their terms. In reality, when one probes behind the veneer of 
universalism painted by the United Nations, it is evident that the likelihood of securing 
truly universal human rights is severely challenged by several competing forces: cultural 
relativism, state sovereignty, reservations and poor compliance combine to fatally 
undermine the United Nations universal rhetoric.  
 
Ideologically, universalism has long been challenged by the competing claims of cultural 
relativism; a school of thought in complete opposition to the ideology of universal 
human rights, which asserts that there can be no overarching values which apply cross 
culturally. This is a debate which has long raged, and one which shows no sign of 
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abating. That the United Nations has so far failed to demonstrate how the commonality 
of universal norms can be reconciled with the diversity of a multi-cultural community 
has merely served to perpetuate and exacerbate the tension, such that the legitimate 
concerns of cultural relativists are ripe for abuse by those seeking to evade their human 
rights obligations. 
 
Relativists assert that the United Nations human rights regime is inherently biased 
towards Western values and beliefs, and is thus inapplicable to non-Western cultures. 
Yet upon closer analysis, it appears that this argument, relied upon to reject the 
universality of norms, is substantively unfounded: we must dismiss the contention that 
universal rights are purely Western values which have been imposed upon the 
international community at large as superficial and misguided. The United Nations was 
not and is not a purely Western organisation representing only Western values: a diverse 
membership proclaimed the Universal Declaration in 1948, and one would question 
which of these rights are applicable only to Western states; one wonders which rights 
non-Western cultures can really do without?  
 
Nonetheless, the voice of discontent over the cultural applicability of universal norms 
has not quieted, and this is testament to the fact that the genuine concerns of cultural 
relativists do, in fact, have a legitimate grounding. While one cannot accept the mala 
fides manipulation of this relativist contention, the United Nations must nevertheless 
demonstrate flexibility in the interpretation of universal rights, such that they are 
accepted as norms which are applicable and relevant cross culturally. Chapter three 
therefore suggested that the skillful adoption of the European margin of appreciation 
doctrine could serve to successfully interweave cultural particularity with the demands 
of universal rights. It is unacceptable to arrogantly assert that rights are universal and 
expect the subservience of competing ideologies: yes, rights are universal – they must be 
universal – but they must also be applicable to all peoples and all nations. The margin of 
appreciation doctrine was developed by the European Court out of a desire to protect 
the legitimate diversity of its members while still ensuring respect for fundamental 
values. If the United Nations is able to achieve this, recourse to the language of cultural 
relativism is less likely to serve as an excuse for those seeking to evade their human 
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rights obligations. The conflict between universalism and cultural relativism is not, one 
argues, insurmountable; but if it is not satisfactorily addressed, the advancement of 
human rights will inevitably continue to suffer.  
 
This, however, is only the first of a number of problems faced by the United Nations in 
its bid to secure universal human rights: while cultural relativism challenges the theory 
of universalism, state sovereignty severely impairs the practical realisation and 
protection of universal human rights norms. State sovereignty, as discussed in chapter 
four, seriously undermines the United Nations in its quest to transform human rights 
from empty promises to universal entitlements. In international relations, state 
sovereignty has traditionally been a prevailing force. It is a fundamental principle of 
international law which dictates that the state has sole jurisdiction for the treatment of 
individuals within its territorial boundaries. International human rights law, by 
proclaiming rights for individuals and conferring legally binding obligations on the state, 
appears to be in clear conflict with the “cornerstone”495 of international law. By 
prescribing rights which must be implemented and protected for individuals within a 
states jurisdiction, international human rights law purports to penetrate the previously 
impermeable barrier of state sovereignty. A perpetuating conflict has therefore 
characterised the United Nations endeavours to secure universal rights: state sovereignty 
versus supra national obligations. While it is widely argued in academia that sovereignty 
has been eroded by the demands of universal human rights, this does not seem to be the 
case in practice.  
 
While sovereignty does not appear to have significantly hindered the widespread 
ratification of treaties, this cannot be taken as irrefutable evidence of the supremacy of 
human rights over sovereignty. Although in theory ratification diminishes a state‟s 
sovereignty, in practice this is not necessarily the case. The tragedies perpetrated by the 
Khmer Rouge, the Rwandan genocide and the continuing crisis suffered by Darfur all 
demonstrate the challenges the international community faces in protecting human 
rights in the face of state sovereignty. When egregiously violated by sovereign states, the 
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international community faces a tough task indeed in ensuring the universal promises of 
human rights are realised by those who need their protection most.  
 
Moreover, by continually asserting the need for universal ratification, the United 
Nations may have unwittingly undermined the very universality it is attempting to 
promote. As examined in chapter five, reservations are an inescapable component of 
the international human rights landscape, yet they have a destructive effect on the 
universality of human rights. States are essentially able to cherry pick what rights they 
are bound by and consequently rights are reduced to privileges afforded by the state 
rather than universal entitlements of all individuals: the rights one enjoys therefore 
becomes dependant on where one has the fortune (or misfortune) of living. In many 
cases, the very act of ratification is all but nullified given the scope of the reservations 
which accompany it, and given that international human rights treaties exist for the 
welfare of their citizens rather than the benefit of states, one may question whether 
reservations to human rights treaties should be permitted at all. Reservations are, 
indeed, a detrimental force in the quest to secure meaningful, universal standards which 
are protected and respected by all member states. The supposed universality of human 
rights treaty provisions has been almost irreparably damaged by the prominence of 
reservations: while the unreserved treaty may represent a codification of the universal 
entitlements of all persons, when subject to extensive reservations the realisation of 
these norms throughout the international community is fatally compromised. While 
reservations exist, human rights will never be truly universal. 
 
Having signed up to the international treaty system, subject to reservations or otherwise, 
the United Nations assumes responsibility for monitoring the implementation of human 
rights within each state. Chapter six argued that this is perhaps the toughest challenge 
the United Nations faces in its efforts to secure universal protection of human rights. 
The nature of the international system, premised on state sovereignty, dictates that any 
international supervision of human rights is subsidiary to national measures. 
Responsibility for implementing human rights therefore lies, first and foremost, with 
each member state. The primary monitoring mechanisms available to the United 
Nations are simply unable to compel compliance with assumed obligations. 
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International human rights law is therefore characterised by the paradox of 
implementation: the ideology of universal human rights cannot be ensured when left in 
the hands of national governments, yet the international community is unable to enforce 
implementation.  
 
The United Nations relies on the goodwill of its members to faithfully implement its 
human rights promises. This, however, cannot be taken for granted. The requisite 
inclination to comply with international human rights obligations is often sadly lacking, 
and the United Nations faces the depressing paradox that the remedy for rectifying 
human rights abuses is left solely in the hands of those who stand accused of their 
violation. If the United Nations finds that a member state is failing to respect human 
rights, in reality there is very little it is able to do to force the state to comply with its 
obligations. Despite the binding nature of international human rights treaties, it should 
not be presumed that ratification will be undertaken only by those states genuinely 
committed to the treaty norms. In fact, given that the realised costs associated with 
treaty ratification are often nominal, ratification may be motivated by a states desire to 
portray itself as a human rights defender: a state party to a human rights treaty is 
effectively rewarded by its position rather than its practice given that compliance cannot 
be effectively determined by the United Nations supervisory organs. Rather, the issue of 
compliance with international human rights obligations is a complex matter determined 
by a myriad of forces ultimately outwith the influence of the United Nations. Ultimately, 
domestic influences, rather than international pressure or legal obligation, are likely to 
determine compliance with human rights norms. And herein lies the United Nations 
most significant hurdle in securing universal human rights: when compliance is dictated 
by the wants and desires of national governments rather than an imperative obligation 
to advance the promises of international treaties, human rights will never be truly 
universal.  
 
Universal human rights are essential: there is a need for a common standard to unite 
nations, and give all individuals hope, a benchmark for that to which they are entitled 
and that which they need not suffer. Yes, the concept of universal rights is a valid one. 
The United Nations relentless push to emphasis the universality of rights is a defensible 
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exercise. Human rights, as such, are and must be universal. World leaders should be 
commended for the vision and foresight they demonstrated in 1948, yet in 2008 it is 
evident that they have “fail[ed] to deliver on the promise of justice and equality”496 
pledged in the Universal Declaration. Universal human rights are a commendable 
venture, but one cannot simply ignore the fact that, as yet, they remain far from being 
universally enjoyed and protected. One must wonder what the future holds for the 
success of the United Nations human rights regime: despite sixty years of trying, the 
aspirational promises of the Universal Declaration are not yet a reality. One can only 
hope that, one day, the reality matches the rhetoric: “we the peoples”497 deserve no less.  
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